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W

hy should we be concerned with inequality in a world where economic
growth has created unprecedented abundance? The per capita income of
the United States is 64 times that of the world’s poorest country, and the income
of the richest 1% is 415 times the income of the poorest 1%. This report shows
that these vast inequalities are a persistent problem because they enable powerful
countries to shape global markets in ways that limit benefits to poor countries, and
they empower elites in poor countries to resist changes that improve social welfare.
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Executive Summary
This report highlights the complex, multidimensional nature of inequality in the era of
globalization. It documents that despite the impressive strides by nations like China
and India, absolute inequality between the richest and poorest countries is greater than
ever before in history. It demonstrates that the rise of China and India creates a new
dimension to the persistent problem of inequality.
This report’s central argument is that, under conditions of high inequality,
elites—both international and within individual nations—may create socially
suboptimal institutions and policies, and they may resist changes that promote
development but threaten their dominance. The high levels of inequality documented
here pose a persistent problem for the world. The problem manifests itself in three
major ways:
l. International economic inequality enables powerful countries to shape
the growth of global markets in ways that limit the benefits globalization
might deliver to poorer countries. Similarly, capital flows are shaped in
ways that disadvantage poorer nations while increasing the frequency of
financial crises.
2. Economic inequality within developing countries often enables elites to
establish policies and institutions yielding patterns of development that
disproportionately favor their own interests. Domestic inequality also
allows them to resist useful institutional changes.
3. Inequality of status within nations may produce hierarchies that
empower elites to establish institutions that discriminate against, and
marginalize, weaker groups, often provoking resistance that promotes
violent conflict.
The problem of inequality will become more urgent as rapidly improving
communications and transportation technologies increase people’s awareness of it. We
conclude there are no universal policy prescriptions. In an increasingly interdependent
world, international institutions should be made more accountable to poor countries
if they are to maintain their legitimacy and effectiveness . Democracy and capitalism
offer the promise of alleviating the problems of inequality in developing countries,
but they flourish best only if the peoples of those nations can develop economic
and political institutions that reflect their own histories and cultures. In developed
countries, policymakers and citizens must learn more about the distinctive conditions
in each developing country; their ability to help remedy inequalities depends on
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listening to and engaging with social and political goals formulated by actors within
those countries. Effective change will be interactive, not imposed.

The report first discusses measures of global inequality, and then examines how
international inequality has shaped the world trade regime and financial markets
in ways that diminish potential benefits to weaker nations. Next it explains how
inequalities within developing countries often warp or diminish economic and
infrastructure development, limiting benefits to the poor. Then the report looks at ways
in which hierarchies of status produce discrimination, marginalization, and outbreaks
of violent conflict within developing nations. Finally, it concludes with issues and
institutions to re-examine in order to overcome persistent inequalities.
The report first points out disturbing global trends:
n

Inequality between the United States and the world’s poorest country, in
terms of per capita income, rose from 38.5 to 1 in 1960 to 64 to 1 in 2005.

n

In 2000, the wealthiest 1% percent of the world’s people earned 415 times
more than the earnings of the poorest 1%—up from 216 times in 1980,
despite hurtling advances by a few nations.

n

The global distribution of household wealth is even more unequal. In 2000,
the top 10% of adults (over age 20) in the world owned 85% of such wealth,
while the bottom half owned barely 1%.

n

From the 1960s to 1990s, domestic income inequality rose in 65% of
developing countries, declining in only 13%.

n

A population-weighted measure of each nation’s GDP comfortingly
registers a small decline in inequality in the world from 1967 to 2000. In
truth, the entire decline this measure records is due to China’s economic
miracle. Among the rest of the countries of the world, the trend is toward
greater inequality.

n

A recent World Bank study warns that only one of the eight Millennium
Development Goals it set—that of halving poverty—will be achieved. The
failure of wealthy nations to fulfill their commitments to fund foreign
assistance will be a key factor if this occurs.

The world trade regime and capital flows show marked inequalities. The huge
markets of the U.S. and the European Union give them disproportionate leverage.
Being excluded from these markets can be devastating for most developing nations,
while exclusion from developing markets means little to the U.S. or Europe. Wealthy
countries have used their power to reap benefits at the expense of the poorest
countries. At the same time, globalization has given rise to a new economic
geography characterized by an upper tier of emerging markets whose economies
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are are more globally competitive. Will the growing power of countries like Brazil,
Russia, India, and China (the “BRICs”) benefit poorer countries or will it lead to new
inequities? Specific findings include:
n

Though developing countries account for less than one-third of imports by
developed countries, they pay two-thirds of their tariffs. On average, the U.S.
has imposed tariffs on imports from developing countries more than three
times higher than those on imports from developed nations. For the poorest
countries, U.S. tariffs are more than 10 times higher than tariffs for wealthy
OECD nations.

n

Agricultural subsidies of rich nations surpass the entire GDP of subSaharan Africa, and they amount to six times all foreign aid from rich
nations. European cows, each with an implicit income of $2.50 a day from
subsidies, have higher incomes than one-third of the world’s people.

n

Under the new regime for intellectual property rights that was created with
the founding of the WTO, 96% of all patent revenues from developing
countries go to firms from developed countries. These firms are far more
likely to invest these funds to satisfy demand in markets like the United
States where health care spending is $4,000 per person than in sub-Saharan
Africa where health expenditures are just $20 per person.

n

In the 1990s, just six Asian countries plus Mexico accounted for 63.5% of
all manufacturing exports from the developing world, even though these
countries contain less than 29% of the developing world’s population.

n

Just 11 nations—with 35% of the developing world’s population—received
75% of all foreign direct investment in the 1990s. More recently, Asian
nations’ FDI share has grown from 23% in 1980 to 62% in 2005, while Latin
America’s share dropped from 67% to 25%.

n

The BRICs—Brazil, Russia, India and China—now comprise more than onefourth of world GDP and they are 4 of the world’s 10 largest economies.

n

Chinese investments in Africa are overwhelmingly in extractive industries.
African exports to China have grown tenfold since 1995, but they are
predominantly primary commodities.

The report next examines how domestic inequalities affect the politics of
economic development, with sidebars on India and China. Very great inequalities
diminish growth by making property rights less secure, reducing incentives for those
at the bottom of the social hierarchy, and hindering efficient operation of labor, capital
and product markets. In the past 30 years, the world has seen a dramatic spread of
democratically elected governments, from 39 in 1974 to 122 in 2005. Yet domestic
inequality has grown in most developing nations. Why? Some findings:
n

Economic crises, often caused by greater exposure to international markets,
cause greater inequality in developing nations. Poor nations are obliged to
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undertake austerity measures that reduce social benefits, while their wealthy
disproportionately benefit from fiscal bailouts.
n

Though many developing countries adopt the trappings of democracy,
the quality of their democratic process has been poor. Of nearly 100 such
countries considered in transition to democracy, less than 20 are clearly en
route to becoming well-functioning democracies.

n

Inequalities cumulate and create the most formidable challenges for
those least capable of surmounting them. Lower caste women and female
children in India’s poorest state of Bihar are not only the least educated
(female literacy rates in some districts are below 3%) but also the most
malnourished.

n

Economic liberalization has coincided with an increase in economic
insecurity in many developing countries. One manifestation of this is that
the share of workers in the informal economy—where employment is casual
and work conditions are not subject to safety and health protections—has
grown in Africa, Latin America and Asia. In Africa, 90% of new employment
was in the informal sector during the 1980s and 1990s. In Latin America,
the figure was 80%.

Next, the report focuses on how developing nations meet the formidable challenge
of their social differences. Many nations must democratize while nation-building, and
they have often inherited colonial-era boundaries fashioned more for administrators’
convenience than demographic reality. The political demands of historically
marginalized groups present democratic political systems with what has been called
“the post-liberal challenge” to traditional assimilationist policies. The myth of
“primordial” ethnic conflict has been exposed by recent studies, which find that peaceful
relations are more characteristic of societies with greater ethnic diversity, providing the
government is strong and intent on averting conflict rather than weak and controlled by
leaders who stir up ethnic conflict for political advantage. That said, violence is a major
obstacle to economic advancement:
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n

Low-income nations are 15 times likelier to have violent civil conflict than
the richest countries.

n

A significant positive relationship exists between income inequality and
violent crime, even after controlling for other causes of crime. A recent
World Bank survey of people in developing countries found that, in the
minds of the poor, physical insecurity is a more serious problem than
poverty.

n

Truth and reconciliation commissions in several countries identified
economic inequality and political exclusion as major factors promoting
cycles of political violence and repression. Studies show that absolute
poverty and inequality are correlated with high levels of repression.
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n

Violence in the world’s 52 poorest nations reduced their average per capita
growth rate by 2.4% each year.

n

Participatory democracy facilitates building good institutions that
contribute to higher quality economic growth – growth that is less volatile,
better able to adjust to shocks, and which produces superior distributional
outcomes.

In conclusion, the report suggests issues and institutions to examine in
overcoming persistent inequalities at a time when global differences, increasingly visible
to people throughout the world, call into question the legitimacy of international
institutions. Among these issues and institutions are:
n

The World Trade Organization process, TRIPs, tariffs and subsidies in
wealthy countries.

n

Excessively restrictive bilateral and regional trade agreements.

n

Carefully liberalizing barriers to international labor markets.

n

Capital account liberalization that takes account of distinctive conditions in
LDCs, especially their poorly-developed regulatory institutions.

n

Reforming market reforms in developing countries that promote elite
interests without improving economic welfare and security for the whole
society.

n

The important role in achieving high quality economic growth in poor
countries played by more participatory and accountable democratic
institutions through their more equitable enforcement of the rule of
law, political and property rights, civil liberties and their more equitable
investments in human and physical capital.

n

More sophisticated attention by developed nations to differences among
LDC societies, cultures, and government structures in framing aid and
investment policy.
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Inequality, Difference, and the Challenge of Development
I. Introduction: Inequality in a World of Promise
Conditions for alleviating deprivation in the world are more favorable than ever before.
Economic growth, producing a $55 trillion economy, has improved the lives of millions.
Growth has accelerated since 2002. From 2003 to 2006, the average annual rate of real
economic growth for developing countries was 6.2%, up from a 3.6% annual average for
the previous five years. Poor countries like China, South Korea, and India have achieved
spectacular rates of growth and substantially reduced poverty. Agreements on the eight
U.N. Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and debt relief mark an unprecedented
consensus among wealthy countries to provide coordinated foreign assistance to the
world’s poorest countries. The spread of democracy throughout the world offers the basis
for improved governance.
Inequality and difference pose relentless challenges in this world of promise. Consider
the limited progress toward reaching the MDGs. A recent World Bank study warned that
only one of the eight goals—that of halving poverty—will be achieved.1 The failure of
wealthy countries to fulfill their commitments to fund foreign assistance to poor countries
will be an important factor if this disappointing outcome materializes. The inability of
poor countries to meet commitments to their own poor will be another significant factor.
In other words, our efforts to reach the MDGs may fall short because they do not account
for the power asymmetries that result from economic and social inequalities.
This report defines inequality in terms of persistent disparities in incomes of
people, though inequalities in assets, health, and education are also important factors
in shaping political and economic outcomes. Difference refers to variation in social
status and other distinguishing features of peoples and societies—language, religion,
ethnicity, gender, and cultural practices.
The report is concerned with the consequences of inequality for economic and
political development. It demonstrates that high levels of economic or status inequality
can enable powerful actors to produce institutions and policies that reduce the potential
benefits to others while reinforcing their position of dominance. The argument here is
not that inequality is always incompatible with economic growth. There are many cases
where countries with high inequality have experienced high levels of economic growth. Nor
does the report make a normative argument against all forms of inequality, though there
are powerful normative arguments against high levels of inequality that institutionalize
privilege. The central argument of this report is that under conditions of high inequality,
elites may create socially suboptimal institutions and policies, and they may subsequently
resist changes that promote development but threaten their dominance.

Task Force Report on Difference, Inequality, and Developing Societies
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A proper understanding of inequality can take us beyond sterile “state vs. market”
dichotomies where analysts only advocate for more of one or the other. Markets
develop along different trajectories. An emphasis on inequality helps us to understand
why markets may develop in ways that diminish their potential benefits for the poor.
Issues of difference play two important roles in our analysis. First, the increasing
interdependence of people around the world makes it more important than ever for
analysts and practitioners in developed countries to be alert to cultural differences and
the distinctiveness of social processes in developing countries. Yet, global inequalities
often enable powerful actors to impose world views, institutions, and policy
prescriptions that slight important differences among societies. These impositions
limit the progress of people in the less powerful countries around the world.
Secondly, accommodating social difference presents a formidable challenge to the
efforts of developing societies to achieve social equity, domestic peace, and economic
security. When differences are ranked into hierarchies, they become associated with
inequalities of power. All too often they result in policies and institutions that produce
discrimination, marginalization, and in extreme cases, violent conflict.
Figure 1: Inequality, Social Hierarchy, and the Persistence of Inequality

High
economic
inequality
Unequal voice in
decision-making

Patterns of Policy
& Institutional
Persistance &
Change

Social outcomes
that may reproduce
or increase existing
inequalities

Discrimination,
Marginalization,
Violent Conflict

Social
Status
Hierarchy

When hierarchies of inequality and difference shape political and economic
institutions, social outcomes may reproduce or increase existing inequalities. Figure 1
depicts what can happen in such scenarios. This report highlights that patterns of
persistence and change can be found in a range of circumstances that have a profound
impact on developing countries. Its three key findings are:
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1. International economic inequality has enabled powerful countries to
shape the development of global markets in ways that limit the benefits
globalization can deliver to developing countries. This observation is not
an argument against globalization, rather it is a finding that the particular
trajectory globalization has followed has been shaped by political processes
that favor wealthy countries while diminishing the potential benefits to poor
countries. While some developing countries—for instance China and India—
have achieved substantial benefits, the poorest countries have missed out the
most. The challenge is to create an economic order that does not leave the
weakest countries behind.
2. Economic inequality within developing countries often enables elites to
establish policies and institutions that produce patterns of development
disproportionately favoring their interests. It enables elites to resist changes
that enhance development and social welfare but threaten their interests.
This is an especially important problem in an era where globalization, rapidly
changing circumstances, and technological innovation require frequent
modification of policies and institutions to maintain economic dynamism.
3. Status inequality can lead to policies and institutions that discriminate
against weaker groups, marginalize them, and provoke resistance
that gives rise to violent civil conflict. This outcome is not only morally
undesirable, but can also retard development and diminish social welfare.
The report begins by discussing measures of global inequality and documenting
that it remains a serious problem. Next, the report examines how international
inequality has enabled powerful countries to shape the development of global markets
in ways that diminish potential benefits to weaker countries. It then investigates the
circumstances in which economic inequalities within developing countries can diminish
economic development and limit the benefits to the poor. Then, it assesses the ways in
which status hierarchies result in discrimination, marginalization, and the outbreak of
violent civil conflict. Finally, it concludes with some speculation about improving the
quality of democracy as a means of alleviating the negative consequences of inequality
for development and violent conflict.

II. What We Know About Global Inequalities
The assumption of social progress is fundamental to the modern era, and many
contend that the era of expanding global markets should be particularly beneficial for
developing countries. There have been remarkable improvements in health and education
throughout the world since the early nineteenth century, and the share of the world’s
people living in poverty has declined. However, economic growth among countries
has been more uneven than what is widely recognized, and global income inequality
has been more persistent at very high levels. This section examines two vital issues:
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First, it documents that income inequalities among the peoples and countries of the
world remain at historically high levels. It also demonstrates that many of the positive
developments in regard to global inequality in
...income inequalities among the
recent years are in large measure a consequence of
peoples and countries of the world
the remarkable economic progress of two immense
remain at historically high levels...
countries, China and India. The rise of these giants
introduces a second vital but underappreciated issue: the extent to which economic
progress among developing countries is uneven. While China and India—and East Asia
more generally—have achieved historic progress, economic development in sub-Saharan
Africa, Latin America, and the transitional economies of Eastern Europe and Central Asia
has been disappointing.
Global inequality—a direct measure of interpersonal income disparities throughout
the world—continues at historically elevated levels. From 1820 to 1992, the Theil index, a
decomposable measure of inequality, increased from 0.522 to 0.855 (see Figure 2).2 The
most important factor driving this increase is inequality between countries. Meanwhile,
inequality within countries rose slightly from 1820 to 1910. It declined in the following
60 years with the most substantial declines occurring during the period of the Great
Depression and World War II. It has gradually increased since 1970.
Figure 2: Historical Trends in Global Inequality, 1820-1992
0.9
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Theil Index

0.6
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Inequality among countries
Total global inequality
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Source: Francis Bourguignon and Christian Morrisson, "Inequality among World Citizens: 1820-1992," The American Economic Review 92:4
(September 2002), 734.

Different measures of inequality in the world highlight different developments.
When we measure inequality as differences in the per capita Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) of each of the world’s countries and treat each country as an equal unit, we find that
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inequality in the world has steadily increased since the early 1980s from a Gini coefficient
of 0.473 in 1982 to 0.545 in 2000 (see Figure 3). When we take each country’s per capita
GDP and weight it by the country’s population, there is a different trend: inequality in the
world has steadily declined from a Gini coefficient of 0.559 in 1967 to 0.502 in 2000.
These different measures of inequality have different uses. The first measure
demonstrates the consequences of different countries’ economic policies. The second
measure weights each country’s per capita GDP by population in order to provide a
more accurate description of the overall impact of recent trends on people around the
world. When we look more closely at this population-weighted measure of inequality, it
reveals a very important development. All of the decline in inequality recorded by this
measure is accounted for by China’s economic miracle. The trend among all the other
countries of the world, not including China, is for increasing inequality.
Because per capita GDP is a national average, measuring inequality by comparing
trends in population-weighted GDP per capita among the world’s countries understates
the amount of inequality in the world because it does not include inequality within
countries. Virtually all studies of global inequality among individuals since 1980 find that
inequality ranges between Gini coefficients of 0.61
If the world were a country, it would
and 0.68.3 This is a staggering level of inequality. If
rank near the very bottom of a list of
the world were a country, it would rank near the very
the most unequal countries.
bottom of a list of the most unequal countries.
Figure 3: International Inequality Measured by Gini Coefficients, 1950-2000
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Source: Branko Milanovic Powerpoint presentation at the Ralph Miliband Memorial Lecture at the London School of Economics,
February 2005, available at http://web.worldbank.org.
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Income Polarization. In the past 40 years, there has been a marked polarization
of income distribution in the world. Inequality between the United States—the world’s
wealthiest country—and the world’s poorest country in terms of Gross National
Product (GNP) per capita calculated in purchasing
In the past 40 years, there has been
power parity dollars has risen from an already
a marked polarization of income
large 38.5:1 in 1960 to more than 64:1 in 2005
distribution in the world.
(see Figure 4).4 Moreover, economic growth
during the 1990s has benefited the wealthy
disproportionately. Consumption by the richest 20%, which includes 95% of the people
in developed countries, accounted for two-thirds of the world’s total while the bottom
50% got only 9.5% of increased consumption.5 Finally, there are wide disparities at the
extremes of global income distribution among individuals that have reached historically
unprecedented levels. In 1980, the richest 1% of the world population earned 216 times
the poorest 1%. By 2000, this enormous gap had ballooned to 415 times the earnings of
the poorest 1%.6
Figure 4: International Income Polarization in PPP$, 1960-2005
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Household Wealth. The global distribution of household wealth—defined in terms
of net worth of adults over age 20 and calculated in terms of official exchange rates—is
even more unequal. In 2000, its Gini coefficient was 0.892.7 The top 10% of adults in
the world owned 85% of global household wealth while the bottom half owned barely
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1%. The average net worth per adult is $153,874
in 24 high income OECD countries (see Figure 5).
This is 79 times greater than the $1,950 average for
64 low income countries.8

In 2000 ... the top 10% of adults
in the world owned 85% of global
household wealth while the bottom
half owned barely 1%.

Figure 5: Net Wealth Per Adult in 2000 (At Official Exchange Rate Valuations, in US Dollars)
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New Inequalities Among Developing Countries. Creating the category “developing
countries” was always a problematic exercise in concept stretching. If these societies,
with their remarkable variations in social organization and history, ever had anything
in common, it was a negative identity delimited in reference to the developed and
communist countries. The disparate economic conditions characterizing wealthy and
poorer economies created a perspective that made it sensible to group these diverse
societies together in a single category. However, the concept obscures the differential
dynamism among developing countries in recent years.
Consider this: in terms of 2005, Brazil’s per capita Gross National Income, (measured
by purchasing power parity dollars, or PPP) is more than 12 times greater than that
of Malawi—the world’s poorest country—but it is only five times less than that of the
United States. China’s per capita income is more than 10 times greater than Malawi’s
but only 6.4 times less than the United States.9 Asia’s economic success underpins the
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dynamics of many important changes. There have always been such disparities among
countries classified as developing, but Asia’s accelerated economic growth may generate
new inequalities among developing countries. From 1997–2006, East Asia grew at an
average annual rate of 6.3%, driven in considerable measure by China’s 9.1% growth rate.
South Asia grew at 5.5%, thanks in part to India’s 6.2% rate of growth. In contrast, Africa
and West Asia’s growth rates were an identical 4.0%. The transition economies grew at
an annual rate of 4.9%. Latin America and the Caribbean were the poorest performing
regions with an average annual growth rate of just 2.9%.10
Asia’s economic dynamism is also apparent in the diverse regional trends in
poverty alleviation (see Figure 6). The total number of people living in absolute poverty
—those with daily incomes less than
Without the 627 million drop in East Asia (China
one dollar—declined by 501 million
alone had a 506 million decline), the number
from 1,470 million in 1980 to 969
of people living in poverty in the rest of the
million in 2004. However, without the
developing world increased by 581 million.
627 million drop in East Asia (China
alone had a 506 million decline), the number of people living in poverty in the rest
of the developing world increased by 581 million. The largest proportional increases
occurred in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa. In the transitional
economies of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, the number of people living in absolute
poverty grew by more than five times from 3.1 million to 17 million. In sub-Saharan
Africa the number of people in absolute poverty almost doubled from 164 million to
313 million. People living in poverty in Latin America and the Caribbean grew by 40%
from 35.6 million to 49.8 million.11
Figure 6: Number of People in Absolute Poverty ($1/day) by Region, 1981-2004
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There are many explanations for the regional differences in economic
development. An important factor is that the benefits of global trade and finance
have been concentrated in a limited number of countries. Success in manufacturing
exports has varied dramatically. During the 1990s, just six Asian countries and Mexico
accounted for 63.5% of all manufacturing exports from the developing world even
though those countries contained less than 29% of the people (see Figure 7). Many
of the least developed countries experienced a decline in their share of world markets
despite having implemented measures to liberalize trade.12
Capital flows to developing countries were also highly concentrated. From
1990–1999, just 11 countries—with 35% of the developing country population—
received 75% of all Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to developing countries while the
other 176 developing countries received only 25%. In 2005, 10 countries accounted for
65% of FDI. Asian countries received the lion’s share of FDI in recent years, and their
share of total FDI stock in developing countries has grown from 23% in 1980 to 62%
in 2005. At the same time, Latin America’s share dropped from 67% to 25%.13 Portfolio
equity flows were also highly concentrated. Of the estimated $94 billion in portfolio
Figure 7: Distribution of Manufacturing Exports from Developing Countries, 1990-1999
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equity flows to developing countries in 2005, the
top five countries received more than 74%. Asia
received 70% of these flows. The top 10 countries
issued 70% of developing country bonds, and 70%
of all bank lending to developing countries was
received by only 10 countries. These categories of
capital flows were not favored by Asian countries.14

Of the estimated $94 billion in
portfolio equity flows to developing
countries in 2005, the top five
countries received more than 74%.

Despite the financial crisis of 1997–1998, East Asian capital markets have achieved
a much higher level of development than those in other regions. In 2004, stock market
Figure 8: Distribution of Foreign Direct Investment Inflows to Developing Countries,1990-1999
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capitalization for East Asian countries was a striking 146% of GDP—exceeding the 94%
ratio for the G7 countries—while stock market capitalization to GDP for Latin America
was only 43%. The current value traded on East Asia’s stock exchanges was 105% of GDP
in 2004 while the figure for Latin America was just 6.1%. East Asian debt markets are
also more developed. The share of GDP accounted for by private sector domestic bonds
was 36.3% for East Asia compared to 10.7% for Latin America. Financial sector credit to
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the private sector as a share of GDP in 2004 was 75.7% for East Asia and only 10.7% for
Latin America.15
The trajectory of globalization is creating a new economic geography characterized
by increasing economic linkages among developing countries and the development of
an upper tier of emerging markets whose economies are more globally competitive than
other developing countries. Merchandise trade among developing countries has grown
twice as fast as world trade over the past decade.16 FDI from one developing country to
another has grown rapidly in recent years. Excluding investment from offshore financial
centers, “South-South” FDI grew from just $2 billion in 1985 to $60 billion in 2004.17
In 2005, of the 77,000 transnational corporations in the world, more than 20,000 were
from developing countries.18 Many of them have a substantial share of their operations
in other developing countries.
Amid the disparate success and growing inequality among developing countries,
an upper tier has emerged that exercises growing influence in the development of global
markets. The BRICs—Brazil, Russia, India, and China—now account for more than
one-fourth of the world’s GDP in purchasing
The BRICs—Brazil, Russia, India,
power parity terms, up from 17% in 1990. They
and China—now comprise more
comprise four of the 10 largest economies in
than one-fourth of the world’s GDP...
the world.19 Together, they contributed more
They comprise four of the 10 largest
than 35% of world growth from 2000–2005.
economies in the world.
Their economies are increasingly integrated
with global markets. Total trade in goods and
services amounted to two-thirds of China’s GDP, 56% of Russia’s, 40% of India’s, and
32% of Brazil’s, compared to a 42% average for OECD countries.20 According to one
prediction, if the four BRICs sustain policies supportive of growth, they will comprise
four of the world’s six largest economies by 2050.21
The rise of the BRICs—along with other upper tier emerging markets such as
the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, South Africa, etc.—has established new inequalities
that pose challenges for the poorest developing countries. Labor-intensive industry
from Asia is a serious threat to light industry in Africa and Latin America. While Asian
countries have a strong interest in reducing tariffs on light industry, such measures
would undercut efforts to promote labor-intensive industry in Africa and Latin
America. They might even undermine efforts to promote industrial development
through preferential agreements, such as the EU’s Everything But Arms Initiative and
the United States’ African Growth and Opportunities Act.22 On the other hand, Brazil
has the third largest agro-industry sector in the world. Should tariffs on agricultural
goods be sufficiently lowered, Brazil’s competitive advantage would greatly diminish
opportunities for agricultural exports from poor countries even where the EU has
given them tariff-free access.23
The rise of the BRICs provides opportunities as well as challenges for poorer
developing countries. Their rapid growth offers expanding markets, and their
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increasing FDI and foreign assistance may accelerate the development of poor
countries. Conceivably, the BRICs might be more sympathetic to the plight of the
poorest countries than advanced industrial countries. Their growing power might
shape globalization in ways that help to alleviate some of the problems of the poorer
developing countries. However, the economic relations emerging between Asia and
Africa have elements—Asia exports industrial goods and higher value-added services
while Africa exports raw materials—that reinforce asymmetries. It would be a mistake
to simply equate the interests of the upper tier of emerging markets with the interests
of poorer developing countries. Whether the emergence of the BRICs leads to a more
benign or challenging environment for the development of the poorest developing
countries remains to be seen. What is clear is that the rise of the BRICS will be an
important factor shaping the development of global markets for years to come.
Accelerated Growth but the Persistent Challenge. In recent years, economic growth
in developing countries has accelerated. An especially hopeful sign is that in the world’s
poorest countries grew at a 7.4% annual rate from 2003 to 2006. Improved terms of
trade for primary commodities since 2002 is a major factor contributing to accelerating
growth in developing countries. From 2002 through to October 2006, the combined
index for commodity prices rose by 95%. Minerals and metals along with crude
petroleum led the way with increases of 246% and 170% respectively.24 Another key
factor that contributed to the improved performance of the poorest countries was that
wealthy countries agreed to provide them with a significant amount of debt relief while
increasing foreign aid and taking measures to improve aid effectiveness. The governance
of many developing countries has improved, and the macroeconomic policy of many
countries is managed with greater expertise.
Can poor countries take advantage of this favorable environment to sustain this
accelerated growth? To do so, they will need to diversify their economies so that they
are less reliant on primary commodity exports. Inequalities at both the international
and domestic levels make this particularly challenging. At the international level, biases
against the poorest countries in terms of manufacturers and agricultural goods are
impediments into more diversified growth. Poor countries need policy space to devise
developmental strategies that are appropriate to their distinctive circumstances, but
agreements at the WTO on trade-related property rights and trade-related investment
measures, among others, limit their policy space. In order to insulate themselves from
global financial turbulence, developing countries have accumulated more than $3 trillion
in foreign reserves. They have experienced negative net financial transfers in every year
of the last decade with the outflows from transition and developing countries estimated
to total more than $600 billion in 2006.25 Finally, the success of China, India, and other
Asian low-wage economies makes the traditional route of diversifying through laborintensive industry much more challenging for other developing areas since China and
India’s wages are lower and their labor more productive than those in most other poor
countries. At the domestic level, diversified development needs extensive infrastructural
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development, but political inequalities can limit investment and cause neglect of areas
without political clout. Investment in human capital is key to promoting economic
development, but inequalities often result in the relative neglect of primary and
secondary education for non-elites. Adequate social safety nets facilitate the otherwise

Africa: The Challenges of Global and Domestic Inequality
Africa includes many of the world’s poorest countries and neediest people, and the
acceleration of its economic growth from an annual average of 3.3% from 1997–2002
to 5.1% from 2003–2006 promises to improve the conditions of many.26 Better
macroeconomic management, debt relief, and increased foreign assistance have
played an important role in the region’s higher growth rates. The most important
factor has been an increased demand for key African export commodities, especially
crude oil, metals, and minerals.
The higher rates of growth remain inadequate to meet the U.N. Millennium
Development Goals for the region, and Africa must overcome a number of obstacles
to achieve the level of development necessary to meet these goals. Domestic
investment rates in sub-Saharan Africa are below the levels in other developing
regions. From 2000–2004, domestic investment as a share of GDP was only 18%
in sub-Saharan Africa compared to 31% in East Asia and the Pacific.27 Inadequate
investment has left the region with a poor infrastructure. Sub-Saharan Africa has
a road density of less than 7 km/100 miles, compared to 18 km for Asia and 12 km
for Latin America. Electric power consumption is only 457 kilowatts per person in
sub-Saharan Africa compared to 891 in East Asia and the Pacific and 1,506 in Latin
America and the Caribbean. The region has only 15 telephone mainlines per 1,000
people compared to 131 in East Asia and the Pacific and 169 in Latin America and the
Caribbean. Public health services in many African countries is woefully inadequate at
a time when an HIV/AIDs pandemic is devastating their workforce. The recent surge
in economic growth has generated few new jobs because much of the growth is in
capital-intensive oil production and mining while labor-intensive industries have not
fared well against international competition.28
China’s presence as a trading partner, investor, and donor of foreign assistance has
grown rapidly in recent years. African exports to China have increased more than
10-fold since 1995. Its exports are overwhelmingly primary commodities while it
imports largely labor-intensive manufactures. China contributes funds for large
infrastructural projects designed to increase the export of raw materials. African
industry is unable to compete with cheap Chinese manufactures whose success has
restricted Africa’s industrial job creation. The developmental impact of Chinese firms
in Africa is also limited by the firms’ preference for Chinese managers. The Economic
Commission for Africa cites concerns that Chinese firms do not protect workers’ rights
or the environment.29
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painful structural adjustments that are part of global integration, but inequalities limit
their funding and tend to concentrate their benefits to the neglect of the neediest sectors.

III. Inequality, Difference, and the Politics of Global Markets
Political scientists studying the development of markets for global trade and finance
have generated important insights about the evolution of international economic
governance since World War II. The politics of international markets has created an
institutional framework that favors wealthy countries, often to the disadvantage of
poor ones. This section discusses the evolution of global markets for trade and finance.
Each sub-section begins by illuminating how economic and political inequalities
have shaped the evolution of markets. They then investigate how global markets have
operated to reinforce global inequalities.
Global Trade in an Unequal World. The most important wellspring of power for
wealthy countries is the immense size of their markets.30 Simply put, being excluded
from the giant markets of the United States and European Union can be devastating for
most developing countries, while being excluded from the market of most developing
countries is of little consequence for the United States and other wealthy countries.
This reality provides the United States and Europe with enormous leverage in trade
negotiations. It also creates disparities in the enforcement of WTO rulings. When the
WTO decides a country has broken its rules, it authorizes the plaintiff country to levy
sanctions that reduce access to its market. When the U.S. takes such measures, it can
be disastrous for developing countries. When Antigua won a ruling against the U.S., it
could not enforce it because placing tariffs on American goods would merely raise prices
for Antiguans while having virtually no impact on the U.S.
Institutions and Power Disparities. Wealthy countries have repeatedly used their power
to ensure that the institutional forums where the rules of international trade are determined
were favorable to their interests. When poor countries put up too much resistance, wealthy
countries have shifted negotiations to new institutional arenas. In 1948, the United States
Congress rejected the charter creating the International Trade Organization as a forum
for negotiating the post-war trade regime and obliged the world to utilize the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to promote international trade even though the
GATT had been ratified by only 23 signatories, all wealthy countries. Similarly, after efforts
to establish new provisions for trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPs), traderelated investment measures (TRIMs), and the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS) were resisted by developing countries during the Uruguay Round of the GATT,
the U.S. and other wealthy countries created the World Trade Organization as a “single
undertaking” that defined TRIPs, TRIMs, and the GATS as “integral parts” that were
binding on all members. As a result, developing countries were obliged to choose between
remaining outside the WTO and therefore having restricted access to the world’s largest
markets, or joining the WTO and accepting provisions for TRIPs, TRIMs, and the GATs.
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The WTO Process
Wealthy countries shape the WTO’s multilateral negotiating process to enhance their
ability to achieve their objectives, though their efforts have been affected by the
changing balance of power.31 Initial negotiations at the WTO are open to proposals
from all parties. However, the proposals that reach the final round overwhelmingly
come from Washington or Brussels. In the United States, the government has
institutionalized a channel for the participation of large corporations, and the
private sector in the United States plays a crucial role in developing many American
negotiating initiatives. This is best illustrated by the central role of large American
pharmaceutical companies in developing provisions for TRIPs.32
Delegates play a much more active role in a “member-driven organization” like the
WTO than at other “staff-driven” international institutions.33 During negotiations,
wealthy countries are represented by teams of experienced civil servants, supported
by expert private sector consultants, while only a handful of inexperienced
civil servants with limited expertise represent developing countries. According
to knowledgeable observers, “the increasing complexity and breadth of the
negotiations [at the WTO]—many of which take place simultaneously, especially
during the crucial final days of negotiations—make it all but impossible for the
majority of developing countries to attend all the sessions, let alone negotiate on
a fully informed and capable basis.”34 In serving to mediate negotiations, the WTO
secretariat is more representative of the interests of developed countries, according
to Richard Steinberg, because it works under the “shadow of power” cast by wealthy
countries and because it is overwhelmingly staffed by experts from these countries.35
During the sixty-year history of the GATT and WTO, all but one Director-General have
been from developed countries.
In the wake of the breakdown of negotiations in Seattle in 1999, WTO members
agreed at the ministerial meetings in Doha to launch a “developmental” round of
negotiations that would address issues of concern to poor countries. Doha round
negotiations reflect the difficulties wealthy countries encounter as the balance of
power at the WTO begins to change.36 Progress has been impeded by controversies
over whether the wealthy countries were making adequate concessions in agriculture
and whether they were demanding too many concessions from poor countries in
the area of non-agricultural market access. In 2003, developing countries effectively
ended negotiations at the Cancun ministerial meetings in by walking out of
the meetings. Subsequent efforts to advance the Doha round were based on
negotiations among the G-4 (the United States, European Union, Brazil, and India)
or the G-6 (the G-4 plus Japan and Australia) However, in June 2007, negotiations
among G-4 countries in Potsdam, Germany broke down over differences between
the US and EU on the one side and Brazil and India on the other.
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The impact of power disparities on the development of international markets
is clear in the bias of tariffs in developed countries against imports from developing
countries. Overall, though developing countries account for less than one-third of
developed country imports, they pay two-thirds of the tariffs collected by developed
countries (see Figure 9).37 On average, the United States has imposed tariffs on
imports from developing countries that are more than three times higher than
its tariffs on imports from developed
On average, the United States has imposed countries. American tariffs for the poorest
tariffs on imports from developing
of the developing countries were more
countries that are more than three times
than 10 times higher than tariffs for
higher than its tariffs on imports from
wealthy OECD countries. In addition,
developed countries. American tariffs for
tariff escalation impedes poor countries
the poorest of the developing countries
from diversifying into more value-added
were more than 10 times higher than tariffs exports. For instance, effective levels
for wealthy OECD countries.
of protection from leather to footwear
doubles in the United States and Canada.
The European Union’s tariff on cocoa beans is 1% but its tariff on chocolate is
30%.38 In 2005, wealthy countries agreed to implement measures to reduce tariff
discrimination against the poorest countries by agreeing to eliminate duties and
quotas on most imports from LDCs.
Figure 9: Developed Country Tariffs Against Imports By Region, 2000
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While rich countries campaign for the reduction of tariffs on industrial
production, they continue to protect their agricultural sector. The European Union’s
Overall Trade Restrictiveness Index (OTRI)—a measure of the impact of tariffs and nontariff barriers—for agriculture is more than 25%. This stands in contrast to its OTRI for
manufacturing that is less than 4%. Similarly, the U.S.’s OTRI for agriculture is 12%,
while for industry it is only 4%.39
At the same time that developed countries exclude poor countries from their
agricultural markets, they provide their farmers with immense subsidies and dump
subsidized agricultural commodities on global markets. Total OECD agricultural
subsidies were $280 billion in 2004.40 These subsidies accounted for 30% of producer
incomes, the same figure as in 1995—the date when the industrial countries had pledged
in the Uruguay Round to begin phasing
Agricultural subsidies of rich countries
them out.41 Agricultural subsidies of rich
exceed the entire GDP of sub-Saharan Africa.
countries exceed the entire GDP of subThey are approximately six times more than
Saharan Africa. They are approximately
all foreign aid from rich countries.
six times more than all foreign aid from
rich countries.42 One consequence of this largesse is that European cows—each with an
implicit income of $2.50 a day from government subsidies—have higher incomes than
one-third of the world’s people.43 The costs of these policies, however, are also borne
by people in wealthy countries. Agricultural protection costs the average consumer
in developed countries about $1,000 per year through increased prices and taxes.44
All but a small fraction of the benefits
European cows—each with an implicit
go to large farmers. In the United
income of $2.50 a day from government
States, 87% of agricultural subsidies
45
subsidies—have higher incomes than onego to the largest 20% of farmers.
third of the world’s people.
Non-tariff barriers increase the
protection of agriculture by wealthy countries. The problem is not just that developing
countries are excluded from the markets of developed countries. Developed countries
also dump subsidized agricultural commodities on global markets. For instance, the
U.S. and E.U. sell half of the world’s wheat exports at prices 46% and 34% below the
costs of production, respectively. Subsidies make it possible for the E.U. to be the largest
exporter of skimmed milk in the world because its producers sell abroad at prices that
are half the cost of production.46
The Doha Round of WTO trade negotiations promised to depart from previous
negotiations by giving priority to the development concerns of poor countries. However,
the Round has made only halting progress and the outcome will at most generate
total benefits of no more than $60 billion, less than 0.2% of current global domestic
product.47 “The limited nature of the gains from the Doha Round,” remarked Sandra
Polaski, “goes far in explaining the lack of urgency demonstrated by WTO negotiators.”48
According to a recent study sponsored by the Carnegie Foundation, the gains received
by developing countries will be unequally distributed with China receiving the most
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benefits at from 0.8-1.2% of its GDP. The poorest countries — including Bangladesh
and many sub-Saharan African countries — are projected to be hurt by the most likely
negotiating outcomes.49 These countries lack internationally-competitive agricultural
sectors. Production from their industries will be displaced by imports from China and
other developing countries with greater labor productivity. And the tariff reductions will
diminish the least developed countries’ advantages under special preference programs
such as the United States’ African Growth and Opportunities Act and the European
Union’s Everything But Arms Initiative. Wealthy countries took a first step toward
recognizing this problem at the Hong Kong ministerial meeting in December 2005
when they agreed to allow duty-free and quota-free imports for 97% of their trade lines.
The trouble with this concession is that a very large share of LDC exports fall in the 3%
of tariff lines likely to be excluded from the measure.50 More generous concessions are
necessary if the poorest countries are to benefit from the Doha Round.
The creation of the international regime for intellectual property rights (TRIPs)
also reflects the persistent domination of rich countries. In recent years, there has
been considerable controversy among economists whether the monopolies created by
intellectual property rights promote or diminish innovation.51 Even as the United States
Trade Representative worked with American multinationals to negotiate TRIPS during
the Uruguay Round, the President’s Council of Economic Advisers and the Office of
Science and Technology Policy in the White House expressed deep reservations about
the deal.52 There are even more serious concerns about whether a single intellectual
property rights regime is appropriate for both post-industrial economies with incomes
of more than $20,000 per person and for industrializing economies with incomes of
less than $1,000 per person.53 The issue is especially pertinent since today’s developed
economies did not enforce private intellectual property rights—especially those of
foreigners—when they were in the process of industrializing themselves.54
In theory, intellectual property rights should balance incentives to innovate with
the social benefits gained from disseminating the innovation. However, under TRIPs,
96% of all patent revenues go to firms from developed countries,55 while restrictions
curtail the social benefits to developing countries
... under TRIPs, 96% of all
available from innovations.56 In the public health sector,
patent revenues go to firms
TRIPs essentially redistributes the benefits of medical
from developed countries...
innovation away from poor countries by raising the costs
of new medicines while offering little incentive for giant pharmaceutical multinationals
to develop medicines most needed in poor countries.57 The increased revenues granted
to multinational pharmaceuticals are more likely to fund research focused on meeting
the health needs of rich countries like the United States where the average annual
health care budget is $4,000 per person rather than the problems in sub-Saharan Africa
where average annual per capita health expenditures are just $20.58 Only where there
has been an international outcry against the suffering imposed by TRIPs—e.g., the HIV/
AIDs pandemic—has the regime been relaxed. At the same time, developed countries
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continue to demand “TRIPs plus” provisions in bilateral and regional treaties with
more stringent patent protection than in the WTO agreement.59
Another reflection of the politics of globalization is that as restrictions on
international trade and capital flows have been liberalized, restrictions on global labor
markets have increased. Wealthy countries often welcome the “best and brightest” from
poor countries while they tighten restrictions on migration of semi-skilled and unskilled
labor. This is in striking contrast with the more liberal approaches of the 19th and early
20th centuries when migration from Europe to the Americas enabled 60 million people
to escape poverty and persecution while making major contributions to development in
the western hemisphere.60 In the 1890s, immigrants to the United States accounted for
about 9% of the population. The immigration rate for the United States in the 1990s was
only 4%—but that was still the highest immigration rate of all wealthy countries.61 Overall
immigration was an important factor in limiting global inequality during the era prior
to WWI by creating a global labor market that diminished wage inequality around the
world.62 In the past 25 years, labor mobility has played a more limited role in promoting
convergence. The limits on labor mobility are apparent by the fact that while global
differences in the prices of comparable goods
Increasing temporary migration by
are no more than 100%, differences in the
approximately 3% of the workforce in highprice of comparable labor run from 500%
income countries would increase global
to 1,000%.63 It is true that remittances have
welfare by more than $150 billion annually.
become substantial—growing to $199 billion
in 2006.64 Their distribution helps to mitigate growing inequalities between wealthy and
poor countries as well as between developing countries. Easing restrictions on migration
could help even more. According to a study cited by the World Bank, increasing temporary
migration by approximately 3% of the workforce in high-income countries would increase
global welfare by more than $150 billion annually. This increase would be equally shared
between people in developed and developing countries.65
Global Finance in an Unequal World. Governance of global finance is distinct from trade
in that there is no central international organization like the WTO that promotes the
development of financial markets. Instead, the global governance of finance takes place
through a range of different bodies including: meetings of the finance ministers and
central bank presidents of the major advanced industrial countries known as the Group
of Seven (G7), the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, the Financial Stability
Forum (FSF), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These organizations are
more exclusive than the WTO. The membership of the first three excludes developing
countries altogether—with the exception of Hong Kong and Singapore, which are
part of the FSF’s membership.66 They only allow developing country participation
on an ad hoc basis. The IMF has a more inclusive membership but its system of
representation is weighted in favor of wealthy countries. It is frequently viewed as being
unduly influenced by powerful countries.67 Bilateral and regional treaties also play an
important role in the development of international financial markets. Finally, some of
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the most important decisions affecting financial markets—for instance the ending of the
pegged system of exchange rates established under the Bretton Woods system—resulted
from unilateral actions by the United States. Under these circumstances, international
financial markets show a bias that counters the benefits of global financial integration by
shifting disadvantages to developing countries.
More Frequent Financial Crises. A recent study by the International Monetary Fund
observed, “The proliferation of financial crises is often viewed as one of the defining
aspects of the intensification of financial globalization over the last two decades.”68
According to the World Bank, “Recent decades have seen a record wave of crises: by [2000]
. . ., there had been 112 episodes of systemic banking crises in 93 states since the late
1970s—and 51 borderline crises were recorded in 46 countries. These crises were both
more numerous and expensive, compared with those
. . . developing countries were twice
earlier in history, and their costs often devastating in
as likely as developed countries to
developing countries.”69 The probability that a country
suffer from a financial crisis.
would experience a crisis in any given year increased
from 5% during the first era of globalization 1880–1913 to 7% from 1945–1971 to more
than 12% from 1973–1997 (see Figure 10). During this most recent period, developing
countries were twice as likely as developed countries to suffer from a financial crisis.
According to a study of 23 developed countries and 30 developing countries, developed
countries experienced financial crises every 10.9 years on average, while the average
for developing countries was every 5.4 years—or twice as frequently.70 These crises hit
developing countries especially hard. Output losses from financial crises were 47% greater
Figure 10: Frequency of Financial Crises
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in developing countries, with an average
output loss of 9.21% of GDP for developing
countries and 6.25% for developed ones.71

During the 1990s consumption in developing
countries was three times as volatile than in
industrial countries, with volatility increasing
the most in internationally-integrated
developing economies.

Financial globalization has caused
greater volatility in developing countries
than in developed ones. During the
1990s consumption in developing countries was three times as volatile than in industrial
countries, with volatility increasing the most in internationally-integrated developing
economies.72 International investors helped finance consumption booms in the late 1980s.
In many developing countries, the booms were magnified by reforms—often encouraged
by the IMF, World Bank, and United States government—that liberalized financial sectors
and lifted constraints on the use of financial assets. Incoming investment contributed
to the appreciation of the values of local currencies, which in turn created problems for
local exporters and import-competing sectors who found the prices of their goods rising
relative to competitors. Foreign exchange traders then speculated on the currencies, and
international investors eventually pulled the plug and precipitously cut capital inflows.73
For example, international capital flows to the five countries hardest hit by the Asian
financial crisis (Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and South Korea) dropped
from an inflow of $93 billion in 1996 to an outflow of $12 billion in 1997. This $105
billion reversal was 11% of the combined pre-crisis GDP of these countries.74 In the wake
of the crisis, exchange rates depreciated, greatly increasing the difficulty of paying foreign
currency denominated debt. Finally, austere macroeconomic policies urged on them by
the IMF magnified their economic downturn. The number of bankruptcies increased, and
unemployment grew.
A number of features of the global economy enhance the degree to which global
capital flows sow economic disruption in developing countries. The growing availability
of short-term debt in international markets contributes to volatility, and developing
countries with high levels of short-term debt are more likely to experience debt crises.75
Credit ratings for developing countries follow market developments. During booms,
positive ratings lower the costs of borrowing and increase capital inflows. During
economic crises, downgraded ratings accelerate capital flight and increase the costs of
borrowing. Credit ratings for developing countries are lowered more rapidly in times of
adverse shocks than they are upgraded in favorable periods, and the capital outflows in
economic crises are twice as large as inflows.76 The behavior of international investors
adds to the problem. “Herding,” where investors mimic the actions of their peers
and “momentum trading,” when investors pursue strategies based on recent market
movements, increase the pro-cyclical movement of international capital flows. Incentives
to maximize short-term returns and the linking of the compensation of investment
managers to their performance relative to other managers increase the tendency toward
herding.77 The use of financial instruments known as derivatives strengthens the
downward pressures on the currencies of developing countries when investors rush to
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hedge their currency exposure in anticipation of a crisis.78 These factors can lead to the
phenomenon known as “contagion,” where destabilizing investors expose developing
countries to risks that are unrelated to their economic fundamentals.79
These are some of the ways that the economies of developing countries have
become profoundly affected by factors beyond their control. Another example is the
manner that U.S. Federal Reserve Board Chairman Paul Volcker’s decision to raise
American interest rates to historically unprecedented levels in 1980—widely known as
“the Volcker shock”—greatly increased the debt burden of developing countries. The
cost of the developing countries’ foreign debt is not only influenced by the decisions
about interest rates made by policy-makers in wealthy nations. The availability of
foreign direct investment is strongly related to business cycles in the United States80
and portfolio equity flows from the United States to major emerging markets drop with
increases to American interest rates and output growth.81
Global financial markets impose sacrifices on developing countries by requiring
them to borrow in “hard” foreign currencies regardless of their economic fundamentals.82
This requirement effectively transfers exchange rate risk from rich to poor countries.
During the period from 1999–2001, while less than 1% of the international debt for the
U.S., UK, Japan, and Euro-currency countries was denominated in foreign currencies,
93% of all developing country debt—including all of Latin American debt—was in foreign
currencies.83 Using soft currencies to pay for loans denominated in hard currencies—what
economists call “original sin”—has a positive and statistically significant relationship to
exchange rate and macroeconomic volatility even after holding constant the level of
development, openness, and foreign debt.
Cost of Restoring Stability. The incidence of economic crises has declined since
2002. In recent years, many developing countries have tried to protect themselves
from economic crises by accumulating large amounts of hard currency reserves and
increasing the flexibility of exchange rates. Developing countries’ foreign reserves
rose by $633 billion in 2006 after increases of around $400 billion in the previous
two years. Since 1997, the ratio of foreign exchange reserve to GDP for all developing
countries has risen from less than 10% to almost 25%.84 In essence, developing
countries buy stability by transferring capital to the United States. In 2006 alone,
the U.S. imported $870 billion in capital. The transfer helps to keep the American
market open to imports. It potentially gives the countries who have accumulated large
foreign exchange surpluses — such as China and oil exporters — clout in global financial
markets.85 Nonetheless, maintaining large reserve holdings imposes substantial costs
on poor countries since foreign reserves provide a lower return than investments
promoting domestic development. According to one estimate, the cost of the reserves
added since the 1980s is close to 1% of developing countries’ GDP—an amount equal to
the projected gains for developing countries from a successful conclusion of the Doha
Round of trade negotiations.86
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IV. Domestic Inequality and the Politics of Economic Development
Economic and political inequality plays an important role in determining whether
domestic politics will promote development or stagnation. To explain how this occurs,
we investigate the mechanisms through which inequality affects economic change in
developing countries. These mechanisms come into sharp contrast during colonial
rule, and the manner in which they create disparate colonial legacies. In the last 25
years, electoral democracy has spread across the developing world. We explore the
puzzle of increased democracy but growing inequality. Finally, we examine some of the
outcomes of recent economic development in an era of growing economic integration,
rapid technological change, and persistent international and domestic inequality. We
highlight the development of spatial inequality traps, cumulative inequalities, and
declining economic security.
Inequality and Growth. Some economists have argued that inequality increases
growth because the wealthy have higher savings rates,87 but this position has little
empirical support.88 Other economists find that economic inequality reduces growth,
but they have not reached a consensus on the ways in which this happens.89 Some point
out that increased inequality diminishes growth because capital market imperfections—
due to informational asymmetries or institutional constraints—limit the borrowing
capacity of people with few tangible assets even when they have viable economic
projects.90 Other analysts contend
Increases of inequality at very high levels are
that inequality incites demands for
found to diminish growth by reducing incentives
redistribution that interfere with the
for those at the bottom of the social hierarchy,
efficient allocation of resources.91
eroding social solidarity, magnifying social
These arguments posit that inequality
tensions, making property rights more insecure,
has the same negative impact on
and impeding the efficient operation of labor,
growth regardless of its level. Recent
capital, and product markets.
research finds evidence that the impact
of inequality on economic growth may be curvilinear. Increasing inequality at very low
levels accelerates growth because too much equality reduces productive incentives,
promotes freeriding, shirking, and increases supervision costs. In contrast, increases of
inequality at very high levels are found to diminish growth by reducing incentives for
those at the bottom of the social hierarchy, eroding social solidarity, magnifying social
tensions, making property rights more insecure, and impeding the efficient operation of
labor, capital, and product markets.92
We can have a closer look at how inequality affects economic development
through micro-level studies that examine how collective action creates public goods
such as infrastructure, sustainable environmental practices, and the protection of
common resources. These studies find that the relationship between inequality and
development is dependent on the institutional context in which it occurs. They
offer an important argument in favor of economic inequality by showing that when
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economic elites receive a sufficiently large share of the benefits, they will bear the
costs of initiating collective action to produce public goods.93 However, there are
three qualifications to this claim. First, the capacity of elites to initiate successful
cooperation varies with the type of collective action problem. In some cases—for
instance, regulation to prevent resource degradation—realization of the public good
can be undermined if the incentives for cooperation by non-elites are insufficient.94
Second, the more elites have attractive alternatives—for instance, through income
diversification—the less willing they will be to pay the costs to produce public goods.95
Finally, where elites create institutions to achieve public goods, they often devise the
rules for their own benefit at the expense of others.96 Elites’ tendency to fashion flawed
institutions leads to the most serious problem for economic development. High
degrees of economic and political inequality enable elites to resist efforts to reform
inefficient institutions. Moreover, it is now widely accepted that developing countries
are poor in large measure because their institutions do not encourage productive
activity.97
Reforming Economic Institutions. Why do inefficient institutions persist in a world
where international competition creates incentives for greater efficiency; improvements
in transportation and communications technology make people around the world more
aware of developments abroad; and international financial institutions take on the
mission of promoting global best practices? To answer this question, we must look at
the politics of reforming economic institutions.
Higher levels of inequality make it more difficult to change inefficient economic
institutions that benefit elites.98 Scholars have
Higher levels of inequality
suggested two reasons why this is so. First, increasing
make it more difficult to change
inequality usually reduces the number of elites while
inefficient economic institutions
increasing the numbers of subordinate groups. As
that benefit elites.
their numbers decline, it becomes easier for elites to
organize resistance to change, while collective action by subordinate groups becomes
more difficult to organize as their numbers increase.99 Second, by placing more
resources under elite control, increasing inequality increases elite capacity to establish
forms of social organization—such as religious communities, ethnic networks, patronclient relations, etc.—that link subordinate groups to them while dividing them among
themselves. “Many of the inequities of the world” according to Amartya Sen, “survive
by making allies out of the deprived and the abused.” 100
The world complicates these stylized tendencies.101 Elite fragmentation and
competition reduces their resistance to institutional change. Changes are more likely
to be accepted in times of external threats and economic disaster. There are different
types of institutional change, and elites are more likely to accept changes when they
do not threaten their privileges. Elites are more likely to accept the introduction
of industrial institutions when their societies have higher levels of human capital
since it increases their future returns. As strategic actors, elites are also influenced by
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the nature of their political coalitions and the availability of acceptable alternative
coalitions. Finally, the impact of ideas and culture may be crucial. Examining the
impact of colonialism on developing countries helps us to understand how inequality
affects development today.
Colonial Legacies, Inequality, and Economic Development. In 1700, the per capita
income of the United States was less than that of Mexico and 30 Caribbean countries.
Today, it is more than eight times greater than the average for all developing countries.
How did this huge gap develop? Analysts of economic development call attention to
institutions as an important variable affecting economic performance.102 Why do some
countries develop better institutions than others? Answers to this question point to
the importance of colonial legacies in shaping institutions that are central to economic
development. The more we learn about colonialism, the more impressive is the diversity
of colonial regimes. Colonial rulers initiated different pathways to development in
response to the colonies’ diverse factor endowments. These developmental trajectories
were initiated with the establishment of different economic and political institutions
that perpetuated disparate levels of social inequality. Political elites in countries
with higher levels of inequality were better able to resist changes in institutions and
policies that promoted development but threatened their privileges. In many cases, the
perpetuation of inequality and inequitable institutions led to conflicts that disrupted
the developmental process.
Colonial regimes were not imposed on blank canvas. Pre-colonial history has
significant consequences for developing societies in the post-colonial era.103 Societies
with well-established pre-colonial state structures and bureaucratic cultures tend to
achieve better enforcement of property rights and higher levels of development than
societies without these pre-colonial institutions.104
Analysts investigating the diverse colonial experience in the Americas have
found that different endowments of colonies, including climates, soils, and density
of indigenous population, led to different developmental strategies, institutions,
and levels of inequality even in colonies ruled by the same colonial power.105 Extreme
economic inequality developed where climate and soils supported the cultivation
of lucrative crops for export to the world market such as sugar and coffee. Slaves
were imported in the sugar-producing areas of the Caribbean and Brazil where the
indigenous population was too small to support plantation agriculture. In areas
with abundant labor, the Spanish imposed practices (e.g. encomienda) that provided
Europeans with exclusive claims on land, minerals, and the right to the labor of local
subjects. Extreme inequality often developed between the oligarchies of European
descent and large populations descending from slaves, indigenous peoples, or mixed
backgrounds. In countries like Guatemala, Peru, and El Salvador, elites used their
power to delay the extension of the vote, and the political consequences of economic
inequality limited investment in public goods such as education and infrastructure
that are vital to economic development. The contrast with the developmental
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trajectories of the northeastern United States and Canada is striking. In these
areas, cheap but cultivable land and costly labor led to more equitable development
characterized by inclusive citizen rights, widespread public education, and greater
access to economic opportunities. These factors, coupled with greater public
investment in infrastructure and policies that made land and capital more readily
available, promoted more extensive market networks, a greater pace of innovation,
more efficient resource use, and higher rates of growth. Moreover, the developmental
trajectories of societies like Guatemala, El Salvador, and Peru differ from those of
Argentina, Uruguay, and Costa Rica where factor endowments did not allow for laborintensive mining or large-scale plantation farming.
It was not the plunder of resources—though of that there was plenty—that
created the gap between developing and advanced industrial societies, it was the
institutional differences. Inclusive property rights’ regimes enabled some colonies
and former colonies to respond more effectively to the opportunities presented by
the industrial revolution. Extractive institutions that excluded vast sections of the
population from secure property rights were adequate for plantation agriculture or
mineral extraction, but they were ill-suited for a dynamic industrial society.
The capabilities of the political system are also important. The type of political and
economic institutions developed by colonial rulers cannot be easily reduced to factor
endowments. The nature of political encounters with colonial subjects created a dynamic
of its own. The French colonial legacy in Senegal contrasts sharply with that in Togo.
The British colonial legacy in India contrasts with that in Sierra Leone. A useful way of
conceptualizing these differences is in terms of: (1) the extent to which the colonial regime
extended democratic political practices; (2) variation in administrative capacity; and (3)
ethnic imbalances in the colonial state’s administration, military, and economic policy.106
Inequality and variation in economic and political institutions are important
explanations of another factor causing disparate levels of development between wealthy
and poor countries: destabilizing social conflict. In much of the developing world,
colonialism contributed to instability by creating political boundaries that gathered
disparate social groups into the
. . . colonialism contributed to instability by
same political unit for the sake of
creating political boundaries that gathered
administrative convenience. In some
disparate social groups into the same political unit
cases, colonial rulers attempted to
for the sake of administrative convenience.
facilitate their rule by encouraging
the construction of rival identities among different groups.107 Przeworski and Curvale
demonstrate that political instability helps to explain the gap in economic development
between the United States and Latin America today. Political instability and conflict
caused in part by economic and political inequality are an important part of the
explanation of why Latin American countries fell behind. In Latin America, the wars
of independence and their aftermath impeded growth prior to 1870. When political
institutions capable of resolving conflict were finally established, economies grew even
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Figure 11: Inequality Within Countries: Trends in 73 Countries from 1950s to 1990s
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when the institutions were inequitable. However, throughout the entire period, political
inequality—in the form of lower levels of suffrage—frequently contributed to politically
destabilizing distributional conflicts—e.g. over land, wages, and working conditions—
which in turn were associated with lower levels of growth.108
More Democracy but Increasing Inequality. In the last 30 years, the world has
seen a dramatic spread of democracy. The number of countries with democraticallyelected governments has exploded from 39 in 1974 to 122 in 2005.109 At the same
time, domestic inequality has increased in most developing countries. From 1990
to 2004, the share of consumption of the poorest fifth of the people in developing
countries declined from 4.6% to 3.9%.110 According to an authoritative study
covering countries with 80% of the world’s population, between the1950s and
the 1990s inequality increased in 48 of 73 countries (66%) with a 59% share of
the population of all countries in the study. Inequality decreased in only 9 of 73
countries (12%) with only 5% of the population of countries in the study (see Figure
11).111 While democracy does not inevitably lower inequality, it offers the excluded
and underprivileged the opportunity to make public policy more responsive to
their needs. Why hasn’t the spread of political equality under democracy reduced
economic inequality?
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Impact of International Markets and Technological Development. Part of the
explanation for increasing inequality in emerging democracies lies in the economic
sphere. Wealthy countries have shaped global markets in ways that contribute to more
frequent economic crises and distort economic development in poor countries by
discriminating against their agriculture, industry, and labor.112 As developing countries
become more exposed to international markets, many have reduced social welfare
spending.113 Greater dependence on international finance has often compelled developing
countries to adopt fiscal conservatism and curtail redistributive policies.114
Economic crises, often resulting from greater exposure to international markets,
cause greater inequality. Unlike most wealthy countries, poor countries are unable
to gain access to international finance at times of economic crisis. Instead, they
are obliged to impose austerity measures that reduce social welfare benefits for the
poorest members of society.115 Spending on public education
... financial crises
and public health, which both promote economic development
consistently increase
while improving the plight of the poor, are frequently hard
inequality.
hit. Moreover, in the wake of economic crises, the wealthy
disproportionately benefit from bailouts—as depositors, creditors, equity owners, etc.—
while the less affluent suffer disproportionately from the increasing unemployment,
declining real wages, and reductions in social welfare programs associated with
Figure 12: Financial Crises and Income Distribution: Pre- and Post-Crisis Gini Coefficients for Select Countries
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austerity measures. Figure 12 demonstrates that financial crises consistently increase
inequality.116
Finally, though the mechanisms vary from country to country and even within
the same country at different times, technological change favoring skilled workers has
interacted with economic liberalization to increase inequality.117 Inflows of foreign
direct investment have increased demand for skilled labor which has enlarged the
skill premium and contributed to greater wage inequality. Outsourcing production
of intermediate goods from developed to developing countries increases inequality
by enhancing the demand for skilled workers in developing countries. In an effort
to become internationally competitive and upgrade their export product mix, firms
in developing countries often adopt skill-intensive technologies that increase the
earnings gap between skilled and unskilled workers.
Limited Advance of Democracy in Developing Countries. Pressure for greater
equity has also been constrained by the limited advance of democracy. Many
developing countries have some of the trappings of democracy, but their political
systems are still not responsive to the needs of their underprivileged citizens. Thomas
Carothers estimates that of the nearly 100 developing countries considered as being
in transition to democracy, less than 20 are clearly en route to becoming successful,
well-functioning democracies.118 The rest are in a
... of the nearly 100 developing
“grey zone . . . between full-fledged democracy and
countries considered as being in
outright dictatorship.”119 In some countries, there
transition to democracy, less than
is electoral competition, but political elites are
20 are clearly en route to becoming
“profoundly cut off from the citizenry.” Citizens
successful, well-functioning
do not participate outside of elections, and
democracies.
they view politics as a “corrupt, elite-dominated
domain.” In other developing countries, there is little political competition because
the political system is dominated by a single party that exploits the state’s resources
to advance the political and economic interests of its members.120 Observing that
“the trend toward democracy has been accompanied by an even more dramatic trend
toward pseudodemocracy,”121 Larry Diamond finds that in 2001 only 26% of 162
developing countries were liberal democracies while 19% were “electoral democracies”
with substantial limits on civil liberties. Another 39% belonged to various categories of
“hybrid regimes” that combine democratic and authoritarian elements and 15% were
“politically closed authoritarian regimes” (see Figure 13).122 Most analysts agree that
despite important advances, the practice of democracy in a large number of developing
countries is limited by weak enforcement of civil liberties,123 excessive centralization
of power in the executive branch, weak checks and balances between different
governmental agencies,124 and limited participation by the poorer segments of society
due to low levels of basic education and political literacy.125 These limits make it more
difficult for citizens to hold their governments accountable. They make it easier for
public policy to favor elites and increase inequality.
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Figure 13: Share of Regime Types in Developing Societies, 2001*
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New Patterns of Popular Mobilization. A third explanation for the increase of
inequality under democracy lies in the strategies of political elites to maintain popular
support. By the end of the 1970s, the public became dissatisfied with the economic
problems—e.g. high inflation, the inefficient provision of goods and services, limited
opportunities, etc.—that resulted from the import substitution industrialization
policies in many developing countries. At the same time, the internationalization of
markets for trade and finance created opportunities to promote economic growth
through expanded trade and accessing foreign capital and technology. Policy-makers
were influenced by the international diffusion of ideas promoting market-based
solutions to public problems. They also encountered strong pressure from international
financial institutions and powerful developed countries to liberalize their policies
and open their markets. These developments created incentives for political leaders to
develop new strategies to mobilize political support in order to make the new policies
politically acceptable even when they were contributing to increasing inequality.
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The strategies have varied with the political context, but in virtually all cases
political leaders were careful not to implement reforms that undermined their own
power. If possible, they designed reforms to boost their political support. In generating
unprecedented growth, China’s economic reforms created a new capitalist class that
remains a bulwark of political support for the Communist Party even as its policies
relegate state socialism to the dustbin of history. Reforms in India have elevated the
role of business in policy-making.126 Economic policy change in sub-Saharan Africa
often reinforced the positions of powerful political elites because it strengthened their
neo-patrimonial rule.127 In Latin America, politicians have used new policies to build
alliances with powerful segments of the business community who in turn provide
financial contributions used to mobilize popular political support.128 Technocrats
ascended to powerful policy-making positions to signal commitment to economic
reforms, and they contributed to a process of policy formation that was more insulated
from popular pressure.129
In many countries, “partial reforms” have
Privatization has been a particularly
benefited some actors who in turn stymie further
important means of consolidating
reforms when they threaten their power.130
core constituencies and attracting
Privatization has been a particularly important
support from particular segments of
means of consolidating core constituencies and
the business community including
attracting support from particular segments of
international business.
the business community including international
business.131 In their review of the distributional impact of a wide range of privatization
programs, Nancy Birdsall and John Nellis conclude, “At least initially, and on
average, privatization has worsened wealth distribution and to a lesser extent, income
distribution.”132
At the same time that political leaders cultivated the support of business and
other powerful groups for economic reforms, they also attempted to strengthen popular
backing for their regime. In Africa, there were few institutionalized means to represent
popular interests.133 Political elites used foreign assistance and economic reform
to enhance their power and bolster their allies in the elite strata of society.134 If any
resources were transferred to the lower echelons of society, it was done largely through
patronage-based programs that were designed to exchange those resources for popular
support for the ruling coalition.135
In Latin America, urban migration since the 1950s and the growth of the informal
and service sectors diminished the importance of organized labor and eroded the bases
of support for populist parties. Political leaders adopted new strategies for mobilizing
support in response to these changes. “Neopopulism” replaced the organizational
resources of labor unions with the financial power of business as the currency of
political mobilization. In Argentina and Mexico, legal restrictions were placed on the
activities of trade unions.136 Mobilizing the unorganized urban poor and middle class
became increasingly central to neopopulist electoral strategies. Some neopopulist
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leaders created anti-poverty programs directly under their control as a source of
patronage that they used to recruit leadership and build popular support.137 Almost all
leaders courted support by using the mass media, especially television, to appeal to the
popular classes. Many broadcasted spectacles that highlighted their charismatic appeal
and demonstrated their affinity for popular culture.138 A startling number of political
leaders implementing neoliberal reforms after electoral campaigns made no mention
of this new policy direction. From 1980 to 1995, of the 33 elected governments that
implemented neoliberal reforms in Latin America, 12 adopted neoliberal reforms only
after abruptly abandoning their previous positions.139
Beginning in the late 1990s, Latin American voters became disillusioned with
neo-liberal reforms that had failed to address their country’s persistent or worsening
of inequality. Since 2000, many Latin American countries elected politicians who
pledged to ameliorate the inequities associated with neoliberal economic reforms.
Whether these political leaders will succeed in creating diversified economies that can
take advantage of sustained high levels of growth and more equitable development
remains to be seen.
Persistent Inequalities Often Increase Inefficiency and Economic Insecurity. Inequality
shapes economic geography. Participation in markets requires physical and human
infrastructure that integrates people with the market. People lacking political influence
receive fewer and lower quality public services than more influential ones. These
disparities become acute when budgets for
The uneven distribution of infrastructure and
social services can generate spatial inequality public investment come under pressure.
The uneven distribution of infrastructure
traps that leave vast expanses of territory
and social services can generate “spatial
backward and economically stagnant.
inequality traps” 140 that leave vast expanses
of territory backward and economically stagnant. In nine East African countries,
maintenance spending covered only 20% of current road networks, and for Africa as a
whole maintenance on roads was less than half the necessary expenditure in the early
1990s.141 In Latin America, investment in infrastructure dropped from 3% of GDP in
1980 to less than 1% in 2001.142 In India, the share of state government expenditures on
social services declined from 53% in the 1980s to 35% in the 1990s while the share of
expenditure on economic services declined from 44% to 30%.143
Multiple inequalities cumulate. They impose the worst suffering. Minorities,
women, and indigenous peoples are acute victims of inequality traps. They face
disproportionate impediments to accessing
Minorities, women, and indigenous peoples
capital and education. Infrastructure
are acute victims of inequality traps.
in their areas is often substandard.
Consequently, they are less able to participate in the benefits of economic development,
and they suffer higher rates of poverty. In Mexico, indigenous Mexicans have an 81%
poverty rate compared to 18% for the rest of the population.144 Women and female
children in India’s poorest state of Bihar are not only the least educated (female literacy
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China: Rapid Growth but Increasing Inequality and Insecurity
Inequality and insecurity are serious problems even in the world’s fastest growing
economy. China enjoyed an annual rate of growth of 9.6% from 1979 to 2006.145 This
growth has produced a huge drop in poverty. More than 400,000 people have been lifted
above the absolute poverty line during this period. At the same time, China has been
transformed from one of Asia’s most equal societies to one of its most unequal ones —
China’s Gini coefficient for income distribution increased from 0.30 in 1982 to 0.45 in 2002.
The distribution of wealth was even more unequal with a 0.55 Gini coefficient.146
Economic insecurity has also increased. Under the old state socialist system, life-time
employment was guaranteed and the danwei system provided social welfare benefits
through the work unit. These benefits have been rolled back. Employment is now
increasingly through the “labor contract system” for public and large private firms,
and through often highly informal labor markets for others. Managers of state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) and other public firms now lay off workers and end labor practices
that they fear result in competitive disadvantage. Eager to attract more foreign and
domestic investment and ensure that enterprises in their localities are successful, many
local governments turn a blind eye to labor abuses.
Employment in SOEs dropped from a peak of 110 million in 1995 to 65 million in 2005.
Employment in town and village enterprises (TVEs, many of which are now privatized)
plunged from more than 36 million in 1991 to 14 million in 2005. Though employment
outside the state and collective sectors has grown rapidly—increasing from 23 million
in 1994 to 102 million in 2005, it has not grown fast enough to absorb laid-off workers.
Unemployment has risen, and many workers have been forced into insecure jobs in the
informal sector.147
These changes in employment might be less serious if they occurred in a society with
an adequate social safety net. Unfortunately, social welfare programs have weakened
considerably. Modest unemployment benefits favor workers from better-endowed
SOEs.148 Workers laid off from collective, private, or foreign enterprises, receive little if
any benefits. Reforms have decentralized responsibility for welfare programs to the local
level, but the share of county and village governments in national fiscal revenues and
expenditures has continuously declined over the last decade. Wealthier localities no
longer transfer funds to poorer ones. At best, poverty-stricken localities receive ad hoc
subsidies from the central government. The Chinese must now pay user fees for education
and health. One study found that education costs ranged from 12-35% of household
outlays. Health care ranged between 5-14% of income.149 The poor sacrifice the most.
School attendance has dropped, especially among girls - from 1980 to 1990, the number
of girls attending primary school plummeted from 65 million to 57 million. By 2000, the
number remained 3 million below the 1980 level even though the female population had
grown by 27%.150 The World Health Organization rated China’s health care system the
third most inequitable system in the world, just after Burma and Brazil.151
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India: Persistent Problems of Inequality and Insecurity Despite
Accelerating Growth
Despite the acceleration of India’s economic growth in recent years, increasing inequality
and declining security will remain persistent problems for the foreseeable future.
India’s economy has grown at an annual rate of 8.5% in the four years since 2003.152
Industrial growth has accelerated to almost 10% annually since 2004. Annual employment
generation rose from 1% during 1994-2000 to 2% per year during 2000-2005.153 Poverty
has declined steadily during the reform period. Only 22% lived below the poverty line in
2004.154
India’s accelerated growth has generated considerable benefits, but these have not been
evenly distributed. Economic inequalities have worsened since the early 1980s. The top
1% of income-earners receive a growing share of the total income.155 The share of profits
in the value-added portion of the organized manufacturing sector increased from
11.6% in 1987 to 45.5% in 2003 while the share of wages dropped from 56.4% to 35.7%.
From 1993-1994 to 1999-2000 (the latest year data are available), inequality of urban
wages increased by 25% from a Gini coefficient of 0.4 to 0.5.156 Regional inequality is also
growing. The variation of per capita income of Indian states rose from 25% in the 1980s
to 43% in the 1990s.157
Rising inequality has been accompanied by growing economic insecurity. While job
creation accelerated during 2000-2005, it was still less than the 2.9% annual growth of the
labor force. All of the new jobs were created in the informal sector where workers do not
receive pensions or compensation for sickness or work accidents. The share of informal
sector employment to total employment rose from 92.7% to 94.15%.158
The challenge of transforming India’s huge agricultural sector—60% of India’s workforce
continues to be employed in agriculture even though the share of agriculture in its
economy has declined to 18.5%—means that the problems of inequality and insecurity
will persist for the foreseeable future. Under the leadership of Manmohan Singh, the
Government of India attempted to promote rural development by increasing investment
in rural infrastructure, but it is difficult to see how agriculture can be modernized without
seriously disrupting an agrarian structure with 80% of the agricultural holdings less than
five acres. A key element of the new strategy is to promote a “second green revolution
by shifting production from cereals to higher value crops such as fruits, vegetables,
dairy, and meat.” The government is taking measures to encourage the involvement of
private-sector corporations through contract farming to promote this transformation.
However, this strategy is likely to promote geographical disparities as corporations
concentrate their efforts in the most favorable areas. It may also increase rural inequality
since corporations are likely to prefer contracts with large rather than small farmers. The
success of this strategy will challenge Indian policy-makers to devise policies to alleviate
the social disruption that accompanies the radical transformation of the livelihoods of
millions of small farmers.159
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rates in some districts are below 3%) but also the most malnourished. Most developing
societies are patrilineal with inheritance passed on to men. Property rights regimes
often discriminate against women even in societies—like in sub-Saharan Africa—where
agricultural production depends heavily on women’s labor. Families invest less human
capital in their female children, and societies impose restrictions on women’s mobility.
Labor markets discriminate against women, paying them less for comparable work.
The accumulation of these disparities curtail the life chances of women even
though they work significantly longer hours than men when market and non-market
activity is combined. The worst manifestation of this inequality is in the female
infanticide that produces sex ratios of 1.17 males (under four years old) to females in
China, 1.15 in Korea and 1.08 in India.160
High levels of inequality can
High levels of inequality can undermine
undermine the efficiency of markets.
the efficiency of markets. Property rights are
Property rights are unevenly
unevenly enforced with claims by women and the
enforced with claims by women
161
poor being the least secure. Wealth and power
and the poor being the least secure.
affect the allocation of resources by markets with
Wealth and power affect the
imperfect information. This is especially true for
allocation of resources by markets
financial markets. Credit markets, in countries like with imperfect information.
Indonesia and Mexico, deem wealthy borrowers
more creditworthy and charge them lower interest rates.162 Poorer individuals who
are unable to provide collateral cannot get credit at any interest rate regardless of
the merit of their projects. In many countries including Brazil, India, Thailand, and
Pakistan, politically-connected firms get privileged access to finance from public sector
agencies.163 In Mexico, politically-connected firms absorb so much finance that they
reduce the access of competitors even though they were 33% more likely to default.164
Insider trading on equity markets like India, Pakistan, and Brazil may artificially inflate
or deflate prices causing small investors to lose their savings.165 Economic trends within
developing countries have significantly increased economic insecurity. Since there are few
good indicators of changes in the aggregate level of economic security, this is one aspect
of economic development that is not fully appreciated. Unemployment is one measure
of economic insecurity. However, unemployment rates are only crude indicators since
most people in developing countries cannot afford
to be unemployed. They find some job or another— Economic trends within developing
countries have significantly
often in the informal economy—to eke out their
increased economic insecurity.
survival. Thus, unemployment rates understate
levels of economic insecurity because they do not
account for underemployment, job insecurity, lack of employee rights at the workplace,
and inadequacy of income to sustain people through difficult times, etc. Despite robust
economic growth and a 2% annual productivity growth since 1995, unemployment is up
over the last 10 years in every developing region but the Middle East and Northern Africa
(see Figure 14).
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Figure 14: Unemployment in Developing Countries By Region
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The size of the informal economy is another rough indicator of economic
insecurity in developing societies. One must be careful in generalizing about this sector
since it can include everything from
The vast majority of workers in the informal
highly-paid consultants and information
economy are poor and their jobs are insecure
technology workers to the underemployed
because their employment is not recognized
struggling to earn a meager survival as
or protected under any legal framework.
shoeshine boys, street vendors, sweatshop
employees, sex workers, and petty criminals. Nevertheless, the vast majority of workers
in the informal economy are poor and their jobs are insecure because their employment
is not recognized or protected under any legal framework. Though the informal
economy is a source of additional jobs, most of them are low paid and subject to
arbitrary dismissal without any legal recourse. Many in the informal economy work in
conditions that are not subject to safety and health protections, and in most cases, they
are without unions or other forms of collective representation. Non-agricultural selfemployment is one of the best indicators of the size of the informal sector. As Figure 15
documents, it has grown substantially in virtually all regions of the developing world. In
Africa, 90% of new employment was in the informal economy.166 In Latin America in the
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Figure 15: Non-Agricultural Self-Employment in Developing Countries: Average Percent of Total
Non-Agricultural Employment, 1980-1989 and 1990-2000
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1980s and 1990s, 80% of new jobs created were
in the informal sector.167

Non-agricultural self-employment is
one of the best indicators of the size
of the informal sector. . . it has grown
substantially in virtually all regions of
the developing world.

The trend toward greater unemployment
and expansion of the informal economy has
particularly troublesome consequences for
economic insecurity at a time when social
welfare spending in developing countries is on the decline. From 1972–1974, central
government welfare spending in 52 developing countries averaged 3.2% of their GDP.
In 1994–1995, welfare spending in these countries dropped to 2.5%.168 The pressures
that limit developing countries’ capacity to fund social welfare programs raise serious
concerns about their capacity to relieve economic insecurity. Since the informal
economy remains outside of the state’s tax base, its growth diminishes the share
of the economy that provides government revenue. As its share of the revenue base
diminishes, the state’s capacity to provide for social protection also declines relative
to the needs of the workforce. At a time when increasing global economic integration
makes the provision of social protection through programs like unemployment
compensation, retraining, social security, etc. more vital than ever, states in many
developing societies may be less able to meet the needs of the men and women in
their workforce.
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V. Confronting Social Difference: Marginalization,
Conflict, or Recognition?
The social diversity of developing countries creates a formidable challenge as they try
to consolidate their democracies. In contrast to most advanced industrial countries
that became nations before they democratized, many developing countries must
democratize as they build their nations. This challenge is made more formidable by
the fact that the boundaries of post-colonial countries were fashioned more to the
convenience of colonial administrators than reflecting the demographic realities of
developing societies.
When social difference overlaps with hierarchies of power, it can lead to
discrimination, marginalization, and conflict. In the colonies of Latin America for
instance, countries gained their independence relatively early, but European settlers
dominated the early post-colonial political regimes and they marginalized indigenous
peoples. In some cases, they forced indigenous peoples to perform cheap labor. In other
cases, they relegated them to remote areas and ignored them. In still other cases, they
repressed them as a security threat.169 Independence occurred much later in Africa, the

The Myth of the “Primordial” Ethnic Conflict
Political scientists’ understanding of the causes of ethnic conflict has made considerable
progress in the last 15 years. Despite its demonstrable flaws, one explanation that has
been remarkably influential among policy-makers and the public is that the violent
conflict between religious and ethnic groups is a consequence of ancient hatreds,
anchored in a primordial past.170 “Primordial” is a term that evokes the “primitive,” the
“tribal,” and the “fanatic.” This point of view understates the importance of immediate
circumstances in provoking conflicts, especially the ruthless strategies of domestic
political leaders and foreign intervention.171 It suggests that these conflicts are a fixed
condition that is not amenable to resolution.
While it is true that violence often arises in societies with ethnic differences,
peaceful relations are in fact more characteristic of societies with ethnic diversity.172
Social relations among ethnic groups can be organized in different ways. Some are
conducive to the outbreak of violence while others are better able to accommodate
differences.173 It makes a big difference whether the government is strong and intent
on preventing conflict or weak and controlled by leaders who intend to stir up ethnic
violence for their political advantage. In its assumption that people simply reflect
the identities and values attributed to broader social groups, the primordial view of
ethnic conflict underestimates the contingency of group identities and the scope of an
individual agency to create alternative identities. In sum, explaining conflict in terms
of primordial antagonisms portrays ethnic cleavages as objective, unchanging, and
impervious to political interventions when in fact they are subjective, contingent, and
greatly affected by contemporary politics.174
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Middle East, South, and Southeast Asia. In these regions, the predominant lines of tension
and conflict were between different ethnic groups as they competed for political power.
Democracy and Violence. The presence and quality of democracy is a key factor
affecting conflict between ethnic and religious groups. As developments in Iraq after
the American intervention in 2003 demonstrate, holding democratic elections is not
sufficient to prevent the outbreak of conflict. Indeed, emerging democracies tend to
see higher levels of conflict than authoritarian regimes.175 Authoritarian regimes are no
more even-handed with respect to ethnic, class, and gender differences, but they use
their monopoly of coercive and administrative power to repress dissent. The weakening
of state authority and the consequent increase in political instability and uncertainty
that are often associated with the initial phases of democratic transitions are positively
related to the outbreak of violent conflict. According to one study, the odds of the onset
of civil war in a given year are estimated to increase by 67% if there was instability in
the governing arrangements in the previous three years.176 The rapid social and political
change that accompanies democratization may lead to a gap between the capacity of
fledgling political institutions and the demands of a highly mobilized public.177 In these
circumstances, politicians often mobilize popular support by constructing divisive
identities that exploit insecurities of different social groups.178
Though it is widely felt that there has been an upsurge in civil strife in the world
with the end of the Cold War, social scientists agree that the number of existing violent
Figure 16: Armed Conflicts, 1990-2000*
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year. Source: http://www.populationaction.org/resources/publications/securitydemographic/historical.html accessed on July 15, 2006.
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conflicts peaked in 1992 and has since declined.179 There have been important changes in
the nature of violent conflict around the world. Conflict today occurs more often within
states than between them. In fact, 95% of all
Low-income countries are 15 times
armed conflict is now within countries.180 At the
more likely to experience internal
same time, violent conflict has been increasingly
conflicts than richer countries.
concentrated in poor countries. A recent World
Bank Study estimated that low-income countries are 15 times more likely to experience
internal conflicts than richer countries.181
While armed conflict between countries and ethnic groups is on the decline,
violent crime is a growing problem in developing societies. A significant positive
relationship has been shown to exist between income inequality and violent crime, even
after controlling for other causes of crime.182
A significant positive relationship has
While the lives of the wealthy in developing
been shown to exist between income
societies are increasingly protected by private
inequality and violent crime...
security guards and gated communities, a
1999–2000 World Bank survey of people in developing countries found that, in the
minds of the poor, physical insecurity has become a more serious problem than
poverty.183
Democratic political systems offer the promise of alleviating the problems
of discrimination, marginalization, and violent conflict between social groups.
Citizenship in democracy provides equal rights to all, but historically marginalized
and discriminated peoples do not necessarily participate in politics on a level playing
field. Dominant groups often exercise a preponderant influence in shaping the rules
of the game. Governments may lack the capacity or the will to enforce equal rights for
everyone.184 Nonetheless, democratic politics encourages leaders and participants to
articulate distinctive identities and interests that challenge democratic political systems
to live up to their promise of equitable inclusion. Liberal democracy also provides
associational space for groups to organize in an attempt to realize these interests.
Marginalization and the Post-Liberal Challenge. The political demands of social
groups that have historically suffered discrimination and marginalization present
democratic political systems with what Deborah Yashar has called the “postliberal
challenge.”185 From its beginning in the West at the end of the 18th century, the spread
of modern, liberal democracy was based on the premise that political communities
were culturally homogenous. States should be administratively centralized, and
citizenship should be based on legal systems that extend uniform rights and
obligations to all individual citizens. In the process, social and cultural differences
were ignored, or worse, undermined in the name of assimilation. Equality meant
sameness.186 Yet as, Alfred Stepan notes, “In multinational polities . . . some groups
may be able to participate fully as individual citizens only if they acquire, as a group,
the right to have schooling, mass media, and religious or even legal structures that
correspond to their language and culture.”187
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Across the developing world, the demands of marginalized citizens for group
rights188 have challenged liberal premises. A number of developing countries have
attempted to accommodate social diversity by recognizing social difference. India’s
legal system supplements uniform citizens’ rights with a pluralistic approach that
offers different systems of personal law to accommodate different religious groups.
In Latin America, the constitutions of several countries—including Colombia (1991),
Peru (1993), Bolivia (1994), and Ecuador (1998)—have recently included provisions to
recognize indigenous laws and norms, and authority systems.189 Though promising
departures, these measures sometimes are of limited substance. Countries attempting
to accommodate social diversity by recognizing social difference must chart their own
course by striking a distinctive balance between recognizing difference and support
for universal individual rights. Only then can they ensure that the recognition of
difference does not enable some members to dominate others in the group and
that such recognition is not used as a ploy to obscure social and political inequities
between groups.190
The efforts of the international community to promote universal human rights
and combat the most outrageous forms of discrimination and civil violence have
intensified since the end of the Cold War. The U.S., U.N., and numerous NGOs are
promoting truth commissions and criminal tribunals as tools with which to further the
goals of conflict resolution, human rights, and democratic change. To date, scholars
have given these institutions mixed reviews. Recent studies have found that countries
with truth commissions are more likely to achieve political stability, improve human
rights, and enhance the quality of their democracy.191 However, several other studies
have found that without widespread political support, transitional justice investigations
may be destabilizing.192 Any reconciliation process must attempt to resolve the tension
between the need for judgment and the need for political stability. Strategies to
accommodate potential spoilers—
Truth commissions in several countries ...
usually pragmatic compromises—
identified economic inequality and political
often involve concessions that grant
exclusion as major factors contributing to cycles
power to those who have a strong
of political violence and repression. Scholars
interest in obstructing change toward
193
have
found that absolute poverty and inequality
greater democracy. Transitional
are correlated with high levels of repression.
justice institutions may also generate
a nationalist backlash in countries
where they are not perceived as legitimate.194
Persistent inequality at the domestic and international levels presents formidable
challenges to the goals of these institutions. Truth commissions in several countries,
including Guatemala, South Africa, Peru, and Ghana, identified economic inequality
and political exclusion as major factors contributing to cycles of political violence
and repression.195 Scholars have found that absolute poverty and inequality are
correlated with high levels of repression.196 These findings suggest that persistent
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structural inequalities are likely to undermine the contributions of human rights
investigations to reconciliation in the long term. For example, the South African Truth
and Reconciliation Commission achieved notable success in promoting domestic
reconciliation,197 and it is widely viewed as a model for newly democratizing countries.
Despite these successes, a 2004 survey found that the number of black South Africans
reporting historical land grievances rose between 2003 and 2004.198 If this trend
continues, it is likely to pose problems for South Africa’s reconciliation process
over the long term. International inequality also affects the agenda of human rights
organizations and institutions. It is notable, for example, that transitional justice
institutions hold local leaders in developing countries accountable for past human
rights violations, but have generally not investigated the role of foreign interventions
by powerful states.199

VI. Conflict and Economic Development
The incidence of war and civil strife is much greater in the world’s 58 poorest countries
than in other countries. According to one study 73% of the population in these
countries have recently experienced a civil
The incidence of war and civil strife is
war. This violence reduced their average per
much greater in the world’s 58 poorest
capita growth rate by 2.3% per year.200 Violent
countries than in other countries.
conflict decimates the economic infrastructure,
disrupts production, and destroys productive facilities. The lack of security discourages
investment, both foreign and domestic. Indeed, as a result of conflict, investment is
redistributed from the production of goods and services to the production of violence.
Entrepreneurial skills are diverted to increasing destruction rather than production.
Political instability prevents long-term planning in both the public and private sector.
Youth are killed in wars rather than educated in schools. Violence makes the collective
action necessary to provide public goods difficult if not impossible to accomplish.
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Haiti are but a few examples of societies whose economies have
been devastated by violent conflicts.
A more subtle issue is whether “latent conflict”—often in the form of ethnic
rivalries—is detrimental to economic development. There are many reasons to think
that this might be the case. Theoretical models suggest that ethnically heterogeneous
societies may: engage in more rent-seeking,201 implement inefficient forms of
redistribution,202 fight “wars of attrition” that delay needed economic reforms,203 and
have more difficulties reaching cooperative agreements to provide public goods.204
Initial analysis of empirical evidence indicated that ethnically and religiously diverse
societies had more corruption205 and were associated with underdeveloped financial
systems, distorted foreign exchange markets, low rates of education, and insufficient
investment in infrastructure that in turn contributed to low levels of development.206
Indeed, some scholars concluded that “the extraordinarily high levels of ethnic diversity
in Africa” made an important contribution to “Africa’s growth tragedy.”207
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Recent analysis offers a more sophisticated understanding of the links between
ethnically diverse societies and economic development. These studies found that the
nature of institutions was an important variable affecting the impact of social divisions.
In attempting to explain the economic slowdown of so many developing countries
after 1975, Dani Rodrik found that an important factor was the manner in which
developing countries managed economic shocks. He observed, “When social divisions
run deep and the institutions of conflict management are weak, the economic costs
of exogenous shocks—such as deterioration in the terms of trade—are magnified by
the distributional conflicts that are triggered.”208 However, economic performance is
much better when variables for economic inequality and ethnic diversity are combined
with high quality governmental institutions—based on evaluations for the rule of law,
bureaucratic quality, corruption, expropriation risk, and governmental repudiation
of contracts or democracy based with strong political rights and civil liberties. Rodrik
concludes, “The evidence is strongly suggestive that countries with greater democracy,
more participatory institutions, stronger rule of law, higher quality governmental
institutions, and higher levels of social insurance have experienced less economic
disruption after the mid-70s.”209 Using a similar index for institutional quality, William
Easterly also found that “sound institutional arrangements” curtail the negative impact
of ethnic diversity on economic development, eliminating it altogether at the highest
levels of institutional development.210
In the case of ethnic divisions, as in the case of economic inequality, the impact
of social relations is complex and contingent. In both instances, the nature of the
institutional context plays a crucial role in shaping the outcomes of social relations.
Understanding the consequences of variation in institutions and social relations is
essential to grasping the consequences of economic inequality and social difference.

VII. Conclusion: Overcoming Persistent Inequalities
Inequality enables powerful actors to shape political and economic institutions to
reinforce their power at the expense of others and the broader social welfare. The
process works at international and domestic levels. Developed countries have shaped
the politics of global economic governance in ways that have favored their interests to
the detriment of poor countries. Wealthy countries maintain tariffs that discriminate
against developing countries and many of the poorest people in the world.
Liberalization of international labor markets is barely on the agenda even though
reducing restrictions on the market would benefit rich and poor countries alike.
Efforts to promote capital account liberalization produced a series of financial crises
during the 1990s because they failed to take into account the distinctive conditions in
developing countries, especially the low level of development of their regulatory
institutions. The WTO agreement on trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPS)
and the even more restrictive provisions of bilateral and regional trade agreements
impede poor countries’ access to life-saving medicines and prevents them from reverse
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engineering and copying technologies, a strategy widely used by today’s wealthy
countries to catch up to the earlier generation of global leaders. More generally, the
WTO’s “single undertaking” approach — obliging countries to abide by the same
restrictions on developmental policy regardless of their level of development — has
greatly restricted poor countries’ ability to pursue policies appropriate for their
particular circumstances.
Avoiding excessive levels of global inequality is a more important issue today
than ever before. Improvements in transportation and communications technologies
make differences in standards of living increasingly more visible to people throughout
the world. Continued technological change will only increase the salience of global
inequalities. At the same time that globalization brings people into closer contact, it
makes them more interdependent. At a time when high levels of inequality call into
question the legitimacy of the international institutions, global economic governance
requires increasing cooperation of all countries, wealthy and poor. High levels of global
inequality threaten to undermine the cooperation needed to maximize the benefits of
global growth.
Persistently elevated levels of inequalities within developing countries have also
played an important role in shaping their development. As inequality increases, the
impact of economic growth on poverty alleviation declines. Higher levels of inequality
are associated with greater levels of violent crime. High levels of inequality diminish the
poor’s access to public services. They erode the poor’s property rights and undermine
the equitable distribution of the benefits of financial markets. Domestic inequality is an
important explanation for why inefficient institutions persist since it empowers elites
to avoid changes that could undermine their position. In many developing countries,
politicians have responded to the incentives created by global markets by implementing
a range of reforms designed to expand the role of markets, increase efficiency, reduce
inflation, and promote growth. However, in numerous cases they have implemented
these reforms in a way that accommodated elite interests, protected their core coalition,
and attempted to attract powerful new coalition partners. All too often, the outcome
has been increased inequality and reduced economic security.
Though the spread of democracy among developing countries has coincided with
increased domestic inequalities, this coincidence does not imply causation. Democracy
has complex consequences for the diverse countries of the developing world, and the
proliferation of democracy in the last 30 years has been accompanied by diversification of
democratic experience. Democratic politics offers the promise of better accommodation
of social difference, an important goal for the diverse societies of the developing world.
By using the greater social spaces inherent in more democratic political systems, even
marginal groups have been able to develop organizational networks that facilitate their
political mobilization and enhance their capacity to make claims on state authorities.
One consequence has been the articulation of the “postliberal challenge” in which
heretofore marginalized groups attempt to gain recognition for their different status
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by augmenting liberal individual rights with group rights and by pressuring for a more
pluralistic approach to legal systems and political institutions.
Recent studies suggest that the problems caused by excessive inequality may
be alleviated by improving the quality of democracy —in particular, by increasing
voter information to enhance the accountability of political leadership,211 by taking
measures to expand the share of the electorate that can effectively hold political
leaders accountable,212 by extending greater political rights to citizens,213 and by
implementing policies that enhance the economic security and human capital of
people.214 If excessive inequality may lead to the persistence of inefficient institutions,
there is evidence that participatory democracy facilitates building good institutions
by effectively processing local knowledge to construct institutions that contribute to
higher quality economic growth — growth that is less volatile, better able to adjust to
shocks, and which produces superior distributional outcomes.215
One consequence of the inequalities that pervade the international system is
that the analytical categories and best practices of the powerful are imposed on the
poor. “For the first time in history,” writes Adam Przeworski, “Capitalism is being
adopted as an application of a doctrine, rather than evolving as a historical process of
trial and error.” 216 The same could be said of democracy. Thinking about economic
and political development in developing countries has taken considerable strides
since Przeworski et al. made this
Both democracy and capitalism are more likely
observation some 12 years ago, but the
to flourish if the peoples of developing areas
“imperialism of categories” that is a
can grow institutions in forms that reflect their
consequence of power asymmetries
histories and cultures.
remains a danger.217 Two of those
categories, capitalism and democracy, are often offered as a universal prescription
without reference to the fact that their sequence and form have differed in the
emergence of the older liberal democracies and will differ among new and emerging
democracies. Both democracy and capitalism are more likely to flourish if the peoples
of developing areas can grow such institutions in forms that reflect their histories and
cultures. Insofar as developed countries are involved in the process of change in
developing ones, they should be aware of the distinctiveness of conditions in developing
countries. Playing a positive role requires listening to and engaging social and political
goals as formulated by actors within developing countries and then finding ways to
assist the people in these societies to implement their own solutions. n
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Bibliographic Essay
The following essay is intended to suggest sources for those who are interested
in investigating issues of difference, inequality, and developing societies. We have
attempted to select readings that provocatively highlight important issues with rigorous
analysis while still being accessible to a general reading audience. The discussion below
is not meant to be comprehensive, but is rather meant to be a gateway to many of the
most important issues.

Globalization and Global Inequalities.
A good place to begin reading about globalization is Martin Wolf, Why Globalization
Works (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), a book written by one of the world’s
most influential economic journalists who is a passionate defender of the benefits of
internationalizing markets but who is honest enough to consider the problems created
by global inequality. Joseph E. Stiglitz’s Making Globalization Work (New York: W.W.
Norton, 2006) provides a critical study of inequality on globalization. For an insightful
view of recent thinking about economic development that highlights the importance
of local knowledge and democracy as a means of building good institutions see Dani
Rodrik, One Economics Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth.
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). Paul Collier’s The Bottom Billion: Why the
Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2007) offers a accessible treatment of the problems of the world’s poorest
countries and includes provocative suggestions for remedies. Branko Milanovic’s Worlds
Apart: Measuring International and Global Inequality (Princeton University Press, 2005)
provides clear explanations of statistical measures of global inequality. He reviews a
range of statistical controversies and draws some persuasive conclusions about the
scope of global inequality. Francis Bourguignon and Christian Morrisson provide an
accessible and authoritative discussion of the historical experience of globalization and
inequality in their essay “Inequality among World Citizens: 1820–1992,” The American
Economic Review 92:4 (September 2002), 727–744. Articles by Nancy Brune and Geoffrey
Garrett, “The Globalization Rorschach Test: International Economic Integration,
Inequality, and the Role of Government,” Annual Review of Political Science (Palo Alto:
Annual Reviews, 2005), 399-423, and Geoffrey Garrett, “Globalization’s Missing
Middle,” Foreign Affairs 83:6 (November/December 2004) are very readable introductions
to issues of globalization and inequality.
Other resources include: Bob Sutcliffe, “World Inequality and Globalization,”
Oxford Review of Economic Policy 20:1 (2004) 15-37, which offers on overview of
measuring globalization that is more brief and almost as clear as Milanovic’s Worlds
Apart; Glenn Firebaugh’s The New Geography of Global Income Inequality (Cambridge:
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Harvard University Press, 2003) offers an optimistic view of the impact of globalization
on inequality from a sociological perspective. Robert Hunter Wade, in his essay, “Is
Globalization Reducing Poverty and Inequality? World Development 32:4 (April 2004),
567–589, critiques mainstream views of the impact of globalization on global inequality
and poverty inequality. Nancy Birdsall, Dani Rodrik, and Arvind Subramanian, “How to
Help Poor Countries,” Foreign Affairs 84:4 (July/August 2005), 136-152, offer a brief and
provocative discussion of solutions to the problems of globalization, inequality, and
poverty. Gavin Kitching’s Seeking Social Justice Through Globalization: Escaping a Nationalist
Perspective. (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001) is well-written
and provocative.

Inequality, Difference and the Politics of Global Markets.
Robert Gilpin’s The Challenge of Global Capitalism. (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2001) provides a magisterial overview of post-World War II international political
economy that highlights how globalization is a process structured by international
institutions and treaties that are shaped by global politics and therefore inequalities.
Jeffry Friedan’s Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century (New York:
WW Norton, 2006) examines important domestic and international dynamics of
economic development since 1896. Daniel W. Drezner’s All Politics is Global (Princeton,
Princeton University Press, 2007) provides an interesting account of the degree to
which great powers are able to have their own way in a range of international domains.
For a brief essay that highlights many international inequality issues, see Nancy
Birdsall, “Asymmetric Globalization: Global Markets Require Good Politics,” Brookings
Review (Spring 2003). Many political scientists highlight the importance of power
inequalities in shaping the development of global institutions. Stephen Krasner offers
an explanation for why considerations of power are important even when efficiency is
also a concern in his essay “Global Communications and National Power: Life on the
Pareto Frontier,” World Politics, 43:3 (April 1991), 336–366. Lloyd Gruber provides an
interesting discussion of how powerful countries get less powerful countries to agree
to new institutions that favor the powerful. See his article “Power Politics and the Free
Trade Bandwagon,” Comparative Political Studies 34:7 (September 2001), 703–741 or his
book Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton, 2000). Economic historian Ha Joon Chang elaborates the contention
that powerful countries attempt to prevent developing countries from using the very
policies that they employed to promote their development in Kicking Away the Ladder:
Development Strategy in Historical Perspective (London: Anthem Press, 2002).
International Trade and the WTO. John H. Barton, Judith L. Goldstein, Timothy E.
Josling and Richard Steinberg, The Evolution of the Trade Regime (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2006) provide a theoretically informed overview of the global trade
regime that raises issues of inequality. For a plan to make the global trade regime more
equitable see Joseph E. Stiglitz and Andrew Charlton, Fair Trade for All: How Trade Can
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Promote Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). Susan K. Sell analyzes
the role of multinational corporations and the United States in the development of
an international regime for intellectual property rights in Private Power, Public Law:
The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2003). Keith C. Shadlen provides a nuanced view of the issue of intellectual property
rights and public health concerns in developing countries in “Patents and Pills, Power
and Procedure: The North-South Politics of Public Health in the WTO,” in Studies in
Comparative International Development 39:3 (Fall 2004), 76–108.
The Regime for International Finance. In addition to Gilpin (The Challenge of Global
Capitalism, 2001), background on the development of the regime for international
finance is available from Eric Helleiner, States and the Reemergence of Global Finance:
From Bretton Woods to the 1990s (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994); and Barry
Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1998). Eichengreen also provides analysis of international
financial crises in Capital Flows and Crises (Boston: MIT Press, 2004). Leslie Elliott Armijo
provides a clear introduction to the different impact of various forms of international
finance in “Mixed Blessing: Expectations about Foreign Capital and Democracy
in Emerging Markets,” in L.E. Armijo, ed., Financial Globalization and Democracy in
Emerging Markets (New York: Palgrave/St. Martin’s, 1999). Layna Mosley discusses
why international financial markets create more constraints for developing than
developed countries in her book Global Capital and National Governments (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003). In “The Capital Myth,” Foreign Affairs 77:3 (May/
June 1998) 7-12, Jagdish Bhagwati briefly highlights the power of the “Wall Street
Treasury Complex” and then explains why countries must be more careful when
liberalizing financial markets than when liberalizing trade markets. Economists Eswar
S. Prasad, Kenneth Rogoff, Shang-Jin Wei and M. Ayhan Kose provide an authoritative
analysis of how financial globalization has contributed to greater economic volatility
for developing countries in “Effects of Financial Globalization on Developing
Countries: Some Empirical Evidence” IMF Occasional Paper No. 220 (Washington, D.C.:
International Monetary Fund, 2003).

Domestic Inequality and Economic Development.
The World Bank’s World Development Report 2006: Equity and Development (Washington,
D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2005) explores a
number of ways that inequality affects development in poor countries. Giovanni Andrea
Cornia, ed., Inequality, Growth, and Poverty in an Era of Liberalization and Globalization
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) also provides a valuable discussion of inequality
and development.
Colonialism played an important role in shaping creating inequalities and shaping
the manner in which they affected economic and political institutions and subsequent
economic development in developing countries. For analysis explaining how colonizers
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created varying economic and political institutions that profoundly influenced
inequality and economic progress in developing countries, see Stanley L. Engerman
and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, “Factor Endowments, Inequality and Paths of Development
among New World Economies,” Economia 3 (2002), 41–109; and Daron Acemoglu,
Simon Johnson, and James Robinson, “Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions
in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution,” Quarterly Journal of Economics
118 (2002), 1231–1294. A provocative essay that highlights the role of politics and the
state in shaping economic development and suggests the importance of inequality is
Pranab Bardhan, “History, Institutions, and Underdevelopment” in his book Scarcity,
Conflicts and Cooperation: Essays in the Political and Institutional Economics of Development
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), 1–26.
Developing an appreciation for the diverse experiences of global regions helps to
promote a more nuanced understanding of the impact of inequality on development.
Jeffrey Herbst sets the historical context for Africa by demonstrating the impact of the
challenges of asserting ruling authority over sparsely-populated territories in States
and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control (Princeton: Princeton,
University Press, 2000) especially pages 1–36. Nicholas van de Walle, in African Economies
and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979–1999 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2001), highlights the importance of “neo-patrimonalism” in state-society relations. In
contrast, Giovanni Arrighi, “The African Crisis: World Systemic and Regional Aspects,”
New Left Review 15 (May/June 2002), 5–36, draws attention to international factors.
One of the best overviews of inequality and development in Latin America
can be found in David De Ferranti, Guillermo E. Perry, Francisco H.G. Ferreira and
Michael Walton, Inequality in Latin America: Breaking with History? (Washington, D.C.:
The World Bank, 2004). Scholars of Latin America like Judith Teichman “Merging
the Modern and the Traditional: Market Reform in Chile and Argentina,” Comparative
Politics 37:1(October 2004), 23–40; and Miguel Centeno and Patricio Silva in their
introductory essay to The Politics of Expertise in Latin America (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1998) have pointed out the role of technocrats. Others have underlined the
importance of “neo-populism.” See for instance, Taylor C. Boas, “Television and
Neopopulism in Latin America: Media Effects in Brazil and Peru,” Latin American
Research Review 40:2 (June 2005), 27–50; and Edward Gibson, “The populist road to
market reform: Policy and electoral coalitions in Mexico and Argentina, “ World Politics
49:3 (April 1997), 339–370. Still other scholars of Latin American politics have drawn
attention to the increasingly potent role of business in politics, Hector E. Schamis,
“Distributional Coalitions and the Politics of Economic Reform in Latin America,”
World Politics 51:2 (1999), 236–268.
Two of Asia’s largest and fastest-growing economies have also experienced
increasing inequality. Atul Kohli documents the growing power of Indian business
in his essays “Politics of Economic Growth in India, 1980–2005 Part I: The 1980s,”
Economic and Political Weekly (April 1, 2006), 1251–1259; and “Politics of Economic
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Growth in India, 1980–2005, Part II: The 1990s and Beyond,” Economic and Political
Weekly (April 8, 2006), 1361–1370 also notes the growing political importance
of business elites. Scholars of China have highlighted how marketization and
decollectivization has contributed to rising inequality by curtailing the welfare state.
See for instance, Dorothy J. Solinger, “Path Dependency Reexamined: Chinese Welfare
Policy in Transition to Unemployment,” Comparative Politics 38:1 (October 2005),
83–101; and Mary Gallagher, Contagious Capitalism (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2005).

Conflict and Economic Development
For a variety of reasons, developing countries are remarkably diverse both in terms of
differences within their own societies and in regard to the range of experience from
society to society. Diversity within developing societies can result in marginalization of
some groups and in some cases it contributes to violent conflict. Deborah J. Yashar’s
Contesting Citizenship in Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005)
provides a study of the marginalization of indigenous groups in Latin America and how
some democracies have instituted reforms to alleviate marginalization. In their article
“Inequality and Violent Crime,” Journal of Law and Economics 45 (April 2002), 1–40, Pablo
Fajnzylber, Daniel Lederman, and Norman Loayza find that inequality is positively
associated with the outbreak of violent crime. Hans Schmitz and Kathryn Sikkink find
that inequality is associated with greater repression in “International Human Rights.”
In Walter Carsnales, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons, eds., Handbook of International
Relations, (London: Sage, 2005), 517–537.
Is it more difficult for socially heterogeneous and divided societies to achieve high
levels of economic development? Dani Rodrik, “Where Did All the Growth Go? External
Shocks, Social Conflict, and Growth Collapses,” Journal of Economic Growth 4 (December
1999), 385–412; and William Easterly, “Can Institutions Resolve Ethnic Conflict?”
Economic Development and Cultural Change 49:4 (2001), 687–706 find that it is only where
political institutions are weak and unable to accommodate conflict between groups that
ethnic divisions diminish growth.
For the increasing realization of the importance of accommodating difference in
developing strategies to promote economic development, see Dani Rodrik, “Goodbye
Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion? A Review of the World Bank’s
Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform,” Journal of Economic
Literature 49 (December 2006), 973–987; World Bank, Economic Growth in the 1990s:
Learning from a Decade of Reform (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2005); and Joseph
Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002). n
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W

hy should we be concerned with inequality in a world where economic
growth has created unprecedented abundance? The per capita income of
the United States is 64 times that of the world’s poorest country, and the income
of the richest 1% is 415 times the income of the poorest 1%. This report shows
that these vast inequalities are a persistent problem because they enable powerful
countries to shape global markets in ways that limit benefits to poor countries, and
they empower elites in poor countries to resist changes that improve social welfare.
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